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Adding Colors to the Chameleon: Why the Supreme Court Should Adopt a New
Compelling Governmental Interest Test for Race-Preference Student Assignment Plans.
By Leslie Yalof Garfield 1
When the Supreme Court ordered the City of Birmingham to desegregate its
schools in 1954, 2 it failed to consider the long range implications of its mandate. School
districts across the country have responded to the Court’s order by adopting racepreference school assignment plans, which they created to designate the particular public
elementary or secondary school a student should attend. Now that these plans have
successfully achieved their goals of desegregating classrooms, the question has become
whether the continuation of the very programs that helped achieve those goals remain
legal? In other words, as Justice Ginsburg recently said in arguments before the Supreme
Court, could it now be that “what’s constitutionally required one day gets constitutionally
prohibited the next day?” 3 This very issue is currently under consideration in the
Supreme Court. 4
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Leslie Yalof Garfield, Prof. of Law, Pace Law School (B.A. Fla. 1982; J.D. Fla 1985) The author would like to
express deep gratitude to Alison Kronstadt and Megan McDonald for their wonderful research assistance and
to David Stuart, for his unselfish willingness to provide outstanding research and sound editorial assistance on
a moments notice. Finally, I would like to thank Prof. Bennett Gershman for his continued support, guidance
and creative thought.
2 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 Adam Liptak, Brown v. Board of Education, Second Round, NY TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006 (quoting Justice Ginsburg).
4 See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d sub nom., McFarland
ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom., Meredith v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Disc. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001), rev’d, 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002), injunction granted, No.
01-35450, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7678, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2002), reh’g granted, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir.
2002), certifying questions to Washington Supreme Court, 294 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2002), certified questions answered,
72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003), rev’d, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g granted en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005),
aff’d, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, No. 05-908, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4349, at *1 (June 5, 2006).
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In December 2006, the court heard arguments on Meredith v. Jefferson County
Board of Education 5 and on Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) v. Seattle
School District, 6 In each case petitioners challenged long standing school placement
plans, which allowed limited consideration for racial preference when assigning students
in grades K-12 to a particular school. 7 The Jefferson County Board of Education plan’s
genesis rests in a court ordered desegregation. 8 When petitioners challenged the plan, in
2002, however, the evidence showed that, in fact, the schools were successfully
integrated. 9 Since there were no present effects of past discrimination, they argued, the
plan was no longer permissible. 10 The Seattle School Board adopted its plan because
assigning students to schools based on their residential neighborhood resulted in de facto
segregation in the schools. 11 Opponents challenged the Seattle Plan as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause since it unfairly favored one group based on race. 12
Justice Breyer, in the Meredith hearings, articulated the grave danger of striking
down the Jefferson County BOE plan when he asked: “How could the Constitution the
day that the decree is removed tell the school board it cannot make efforts any more, it
can’t do what its been doing and we’ll send the children back to their black schools and

See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Meredith, No. 05-915 (Dec. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-915.pdf. See also, Transcript of
Oral Argument , Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) v. Seattle School District available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-908.pdf.
6 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002), injunction granted,
No. 01-35450, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7678, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2002), reh’g granted, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir.
2002), certifying questions to Washington Supreme Court, 294 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2002), certified questions answered,
72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003), rev’d, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g granted en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005),
aff’d, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, No. 05-908, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4349, at *1 (June 5, 2006).
7 McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 836.
8 Id. The plan was developed in response to a 1975 federal court order. The school chose to continue the
program of integration after the end of the court mandate. Id.
9 See id. at 841-42.
10 See McFarland, 330 F.Supp. at 835,
11
Parents Involved in Cmty Schs, 426 F.3d at 1169.
12
Id.
5
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white schools?” 13 Yet, current law supports doing just that, since the Court has held that
absent proof of present effects of past discrimination, a court may strike down race
preference programs. 14
As a general matter, the Court can only uphold Equal Protection challenges to
race-preference plans if the plan survives the strict scrutiny test. 15 Under the current law,
plans will survive if the defending group can show a compelling governmental interest in
achieving the plans’ goals, which the Court has found can be supported by evidence of
present effects of past discrimination or by proof that the program will create “viewpoint
diversity.” 16
Neither the Jefferson County BOE Plan nor the Seattle Plan are likely to survive
strict scrutiny under the Court’s current compelling governmental interest tests. First,
neither defendant can produce evidence that their plans are in place to remedy present
effects of past discrimination. Second, while there clearly is viewpoint diversity in
integrated classrooms, several appellate court judges have raised concern that there is
little need for viewpoint diversity at the K-12 grade levels since the learning experience
in elementary and secondary schools is distinguishable from the learning experience at
the university level. 17
Because the race-preference student assignment plans currently under
consideration before the Court potentially fail to withstand strict scrutiny, the Court may
be forced to identify a new socially correct interest that overrides the Equal Protection
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 12.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 363 (1978) (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 357-62 (1977)).
15 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
16 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2005),
17 See infra notes 114-117 and notes 171-186 and accompanying text; see also, Cavalier ex rel. Cavalier v. Caddo
Parish Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 246, 259 n. 15 (5th Cir. 2005); Hopwood v. Tex., 78 F.3d 932, 948 (5th Cir. 1996); but
see Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. , No. 1, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004).
13
14
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violation even though those programs were arguably created in same educational context
as previously considered race-preference admissions plans. 18 In Grutter v. Bollinger, 19
Justice O’Connor wrote that “context matters” in evaluating the constitutionality of racepreference programs. 20 The Court must distinguish the context of the plans challenged in
Meredith and PICS, therefore, in order to justify a new compelling governmental interest.
The Court can cast the education race-preference plans at the K-12 level in a
different context than those at the graduate school level since the educational goals of
attaining diversity at grades K-12 is easily distinguishable from attaining diversity in
classrooms of higher education. Under Grutter, identifying a new context justifies
defining a new compelling governmental interest.
The Court must articulate a third compelling governmental interest upholding
race-preference plans or programs where the programs abolishment would threaten a
return to the de facto segregation that the plans originally sought to cure. Part I of this
article will define the historical evolution of the strict scrutiny test and the Court’s
willingness to allow the context of a particular race-preference issue to drive the
definition of a compelling governmental interest. Part II of this article will consider
appellate court responses to the applicability of the Court’s two articulated compelling
governmental interests particularly in cases considering challenges to race-preference
student assignment plans. Finally, Part III will argue that the Court must create a new
compelling governmental interest for evaluation of race-preference student assignment
plans, since invalidation of these School Board plans would cause a return to the social
conditions that originally necessitated their creation.
18

See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2005).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2005).
20 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
19
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1. The Supreme Court’s Application of the Strict Scrutiny Test
The Supreme Court has long held that any race-preference policy must be subject
to the strictest scrutiny. 21 A policy passes the strict scrutiny test if the governmental
body defending the policy can demonstrate that there is a compelling governmental
interest in using the policy and that the policy is narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 22
The Court first used the strict scrutiny test to evaluate a race-preference policy in Regents
of the University of California at Davis v. Bakke. 23
The Bakke case considered an equal protection challenge to the University of
California at Davis Medical School’s (“Davis”) 1973 admissions policy, which the school
adopted in an effort to diversify its entering class. 24 Allen Bakke, a white male who had
been rejected from the school, claimed that the policy, which set aside a number of seats
for students in identified minority groups, 25 violated the Equal Protection Clause, 26 the
California Constitution, 27 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”). 28

See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
22 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
23 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
24 Id. at 265.
25 Id. Davis utilized a bifurcated admissions policy. One committee considered nonminority applicants who had
achieved a minimum 2.5 undergraduate GPA (“UGPA”). Id. at 275. A separate committee considered all
minority applicants, regardless of their objective scores. Id. at 274-75. The school maintained a certain number
of seats for applicants from each of the groups. Id. at 275. Bakke claimed that the policy, which allowed the
school to reserve a certain amount of places for minority applicants with lower objective scores than his own,
was tantamount to a quota. Id. at 277-78.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
27 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not
granted on the same terms to all citizens. Privileges or immunities granted by the Legislature may be altered or
revoked.”).
28 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) (“No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
Bakke filed suit in the Superior Court of California, which held that Davis’ admission policy was a
racial quota and therefore violated the California and United States Constitution, as well as Title VI. The
California Supreme Court affirmed, and upon the State’s appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States took
21
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Petitioner, the Regents of the University of California, argued that the Davis program
should not be subject to the strict scrutiny test for two reasons. First, Petitioner argued,
white males are not members of a discrete and insular minority group and as such do not
require extraordinary protection. 29 Secondly, petitioner pointed out that in instances
where race was a factor, such as school and employment desegregation, the Court did not
always subject the challenged program or policy to strict scrutiny. 30 The Bakke case was
the first of its kind to raise the issue of reverse discrimination. The court concluded that
because the Davis program involved the use of an explicit racial classification the
program’s preferential treatment potentially disregarded individual rights as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 31 When a program touches upon “an individual’s race or
ethnic background,: Justice Powell wrote, “he is entitled to a judicial determination that
the burden he is asked to bear . . . is precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.” 32
The Court’s language became the embodiment of the strict scrutiny test. 33 Any
program or policy that had a direct impact on an individual because of race, regardless of
membership in a minority class, would be subject to the most exacting review.

Under

certiorari. The Supreme Court, considering both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI, eventually affirmed
the California Supreme Court’s decision. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271.
29 Id. at 278.
30 The Davis special admissions program involves the use of
an explicit racial classification never before countenanced by this Court. It tells applicants
who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specific
percentage of the seats in an entering class. No matter how strong their qualifications,
quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to educational
diversity, they are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred
groups for the special admissions seats. At the same time, the preferred applicants have the
opportunity to compete for every seat in the class.
Id. at 319-20.
31 Id. at 320 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
32 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (citing Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351
(1938). In “order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is
both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is ‘necessary . . . to the
accomplishment’ of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.” In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973).
33 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 300 (citing Shelley, 334 U.S at 22).

6

Bakke, the party promoting the challenged race-preference program would have to
demonstrate that there was a compelling governmental interest in the program and that
the program was narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 34
The Court, in a highly fractionalized opinion, struck down the Davis policy.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, concluded that the Davis program violated both
Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause. 35 Applying the strict scrutiny test, 36 Justice
Powell found that there was a compelling governmental interest in attaining a diverse
student body. 37 However, while the Constitution does not bar admission policies from
introducing race as a factor in the selection process, Justice Powell concluded that the
program was not narrowly tailored and that preferring members of any one group for no
reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination on its own. 38 The Davis
admissions policy, which set aside a specific number of seats for students in identified
minority groups, unfairly benefited the interest of a victimized group at the expense of
other innocent individuals, and therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause. 39
Justice Powell, therefore, concluded that the Davis admissions policy was constitutionally
impermissible.
The Bakke Court was the first to conclude that programs designed to achieve
diversity at the graduate school level served a compelling governmental interest.

40

Indeed, a majority of the Bakke Court recognized the University’s Constitutional right to

See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299.
Id. at 270-71.
36 Id. at 299.
37 Id. at 311-12. A diverse student body contributing to a robust exchange of ideas is a constitutionally
permissible goal on which a race-conscious university admissions program may be predicated. Id.
38 Id. at 307.
39 Id. Additionally, its practice of having separate admissions subcommittees review minority and non-minority
candidates inappropriately insulated applicants from comparison against the entire admissions pool. Id. at 315.
40 Id. at 317.
34
35
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select students who would best contribute to the “‘robust exchange of ideas.’ ”41 Ethnic
diversity, however, is one element in a range of factors a university may properly
consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body. 42 Justice Powell’s edict
would come to be called “viewpoint diversity” 43 and would hold that evidence that a racepreference admission program was designed to create viewpoint diversity was sufficient
to support a court finding of a compelling governmental interest.
Almost a decade after Bakke, the Court began reviewing a series of challenges to
race-preference policies in the workplace.44 These cases, read together, articulated clear
guidelines for the application of the strict scrutiny test 45 and confirmed that a reviewing
court could only uphold an affirmative action program or policy in the work place if it
was aimed at ameliorating present effects of past discrimination and if the program was
narrowly tailored to meet that goal. 46

Id. at 312-13 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist joined in Justice
Powell’s opinion that the program was invalid because it violated Title VI, and thus, there was no need to
evaluate the program under the Equal Protection Clause. See id, at 420 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part). Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun were in the minority,
concluding that Title VI permits federally-funded entities to enact programs or policies that assist minority
groups to gain equal access to programs more easily available to Caucasians. Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment and dissenting in part). However, Title VI and the Civil Rights Act do not take precedence
over the constitutional protection of the Equal Rights Clause, and thus, such programs or policies are valid
only to the extent that they are coterminous with the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 340 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part.) Thus, because four Justices chose to limit the extent of their
agreement with Justice Powell’s conclusion, Justice Powell’s scrutiny of the Davis Policy under the Equal
Protection Clause became, in a sense, a majority of one.
43 Judge Friedman, writing for the The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, first identified the
term “viewpoint diversity” in the context of race-prefernce programs. Diversty viewpoint means “a diversity
of viewpoints, experiences, interests, perspectives, and backgrounds which creates an atmosphere most
conducive to learning.” Grutter v. Bolinger, 137 F. Supp 821, 849
44 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986).
45 See generally Paradise, 480 U.S. 149; see also id. at 171 (citing Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Intern. Ass’n v.
E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 481 (1986)) (listing several factors to consider in determining the appropriateness of
race-conscious guidelines, “including the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the
flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of the
numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.”).
46 See Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (holding that courts must apply the strict scrutiny test to judicial review of state and
41
42
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In the first post-Bakke decision to consider the constitutionality of affirmative
action admission policies, Justice Powell, again writing for the plurality, took the
opportunity to reaffirm the requirement that these programs pass the strict scrutiny test
before a court may pronounce them as constitutional. 47 In Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, 48 the Court considered a collective bargaining agreement between the Board
of Education and a teachers’ union that provided for layoffs by seniority where the
percentage of minorities laid off would exceed the percentage of minorities employed at
the time. 49 In this instance, the Court found, that the government’s interest in reversing
the trend of societal discrimination was not sufficient to support a compelling
governmental interest. 50 The Court struck down the policy for violating the Fourteenth
Amendment, holding that “some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental
unit involved” is required before limited use of racial classifications is allowed in order to
remedy discrimination. 51
The Court took the opportunity to reaffirm its position on what evidence would
support a compelling governmental interest in the next Equal Protection challenge to a
race preference policy, when it decided United States v. Paradise. 52

The court in

Paradise considered the constitutionality of a one-black-to-one-white promotion plan that

local government affirmative action programs); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (mandating the use of the strict
scrutiny test for federal race-preference preference programs). See generally Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring
Affirmative Action Admissions Policies with Federal Judicial Guidelines: A Model for the Twenty-First Century, 22 J.C. &
U.L. 895 (1996).
47 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274. Justice Powell widely cited Bakke in his decision.
48 Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 314-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274. Justice Powell wrote that where race-preference programs are concerned, the racial
classification must be justified by “a compelling state purpose . . . . [and] the means chosen by the State to
effectuate that purpose must be narrowly tailored.” Id. at 274. The school board's policy of extending
preferential protection against layoffs to some employees because of their race violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.
50 Id. at 274-75.
51 Id. at 274.
52 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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the Alabama Department of Public Safety adopted pursuant to a district court consent
decree. 53 Relying on Wygant, Justice Brennan wrote that the court will always find a
compelling governmental interest where the entity promoting the policy can demonstrate
that it is designed to remedy present effects of past discrimination. 54
Following Paradise, the Court was faced with several more challenges to
affirmative action programs aimed at eradicating discrimination in the workplace and in
each instance.. 55 In City of Richmond v. Croson, 56 which considered a municipal plan
that required a primary city contractor to award 30% of the amount of its contract to
Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs), defined as subcontractor businesses owned by
members of certain minority groups. 57 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 58 the
Supreme Court extended the strict scrutiny standard of review to federal race-preference
preference programs. 59 Both Adarand and Croson confirmed that there is acompelling

Id. at 154-55.
Id. at 183-85. In Wygant, the Majority also turned its attention to the definition of “narrowly tailored,
acknowledging that it had not previously defined precisely what “narrowly tailored” meant. , In evaluating
whether a program was narrowly tailored, the court must look at: (1) “the necessity for the relief and the
efficacy of alternative remedies;” (2) “the flexibility and duration of the relief;” (3) “the relationship between
the numerical goals to the relevant labor market;” and (4) “the impact of the relief on the rights of third
parties.” Id. at 171 (citing Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481 (1986) and Sheet Metal Workers, 478
U.S. at 486 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)); see also Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at
487 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court would not uphold a benign racepreference remedial policy unless the policy was the least intrusive and most effective means to achieve the
goals of the entity’s program. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 266 (1978); but
see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (where the Court said that “narrow tailoring does not require
exhaustion of every race neutral alternative.”).
55 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Croson, 488 U.S. 469; see also, Garfield, supra
note 47.
56 Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
57 Id. at 478. Justices Rehnquist, White, Kennedy and Scalia agreed with that portion of the opinion, concurring.
Id. at 475.
58 Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
59 Id. Adarand considered the constitutionality of a federal statute that granted financial incentives to prime
contractors who awarded subcontracts to companies controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals. Id. at 206-07. Prior to Adarand, Metro Broad. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990), was the precedent.
Metro Broadcasting held that “benign” federal racial classifications need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny. See
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 564-65. Justice O’Connor suggested that the need for intermediate scrutiny may have
evolved from the principle that the Fifth Amendment does not protect individual rights to the same extent as
the Fourteenth Amendment. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213. This was in sharp contrast to the Court’s requirement
53
54
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governmental interest in eradicating present effects of past discrimination.
In 2003, the Court, for the first time in 25 years, revisited the constitutionality of
race-preference programs aimed at achieving diversity in the classroom. Grutter v.
Bollinger and its companion case Gratz v. Bollinger 60 considered the constitutionality of
affirmative action admission programs at the University of Michigan School of Law
(Law School) and the University of Michigan Literature Science and Arts School (LSA)
respectively. In each instance, the Supreme Court concluded that the particulars of the
strict scrutiny test it applied in Wygant and Paradise was ill-suited for evaluating the
present challenges.
Plaintiffs in Gratz 61 challenged LSA’s admissions policy, alleging that it
improperly used race as a factor, in violation of sections 1981 and 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act, 62 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 63 The
school used a 150-point scale, to rate applicants. Applicants were assigned a number of
points for scholarship, curriculum, under-represented minority status, geographical
location, and alumni relation. Students were assigned twenty points if they were underrepresented minorities. 64 The admissions committee limited its review to applicants who

that the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny of “benign” state or local race-preference preference
policies. See id. at 222. A majority of the Adarand court overruled Metro Broadcasting, holding that the more
stringent standard should apply to all race-preference preference policies, regardless of who implements the
policy. Id. at 227. The strict scrutiny test “ensures that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has
not been infringed.” Id.
60 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
61 Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher “both applied for admission to the University of Michigan’s
(University) College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as residents of the State of Michigan. Both
petitioners are Caucasian.” Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251. Both were told that they were qualified but not sufficiently to
be admitted for “first review.” Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 109a). Both were later denied admission and
attended alternate universities. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251.
62 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (2006).
63 Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209, 210 (E.D. Mich. 1998). The complaint was filed on October, 14, 1997.
Id.
64 Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 827 & n. 27 (E.D. Mich. 2000). LSA did not set aside a fixed number
of seats for applicants. Id. at 827.
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attained a certain SCUGA number. 65

The District Court upheld the program and

plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. 66
Concurrent with the court’s consideration of Gratz, Barbara Grutter challenged
the Law School’s admissions policy, whose mission statement called for enrollment of a
“critical mass of minority students” as a means of ensuring a diverse student body. 67
Under the written policy, those reviewing applications for admission were encouraged to
consider factors including recommendations, quality of one’s undergraduate institution,
essays, course selection, and whether the applicant had a perspective or experience that
would contribute to a diverse student body. 68 The District Court struck down the Law

See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255. Once an applicant earned enough points to make it to the individual review phase
of the admissions policy, the committee disregarded the applicant’s SCUGA score. Id. Rather, it paid
particular attention to the qualities that would make the candidate a suitable student for matriculation at the
school. Id. LSA also had a policy of allowing counselors to “flag” applications of certain students who would
otherwise not have passed the first selection procedure, allowing for a limited number of applicants, who did
not have the necessary SCUGA score, to be considered in the individual review phase of the admissions
proceedings. Id. The SCUGA factors were: S-socioeconomic status, C-curriculum, U-underrepresented
minority, G-geography, A-alumni. Id.
The faculty at the University of Michigan had adopted its admissions policy to accomplish its stated
goal of admitting a diverse class, for the benefit of all students in the classroom. See Gratz , 122 F. Supp. 2d at
814. From 1995 to 1998, LSA’s admissions policy specifically “protected” a certain number of spots for
minority candidates. Id.at 831. In 1999, LSA modified its admissions program to the challenged program. Id. at
827. Applicants with SCUGA scores below a threshold number were automatically rejected from the school.
See id. at 827.
66 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). The Supreme Court found that the school’s program was not
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest of achieving a diverse classroom. Id. at 275.
67 Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 832 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The Law School’s admissions policy was
adopted in 1992 and it expresses the school’s desire “to admit a group of students who individually and
collectively are among the most capable students applying to American law schools in a given year . . . .
Collectively, we seek a mix of students with varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn
from each other.” Id. at 825. The law school hoped that “[b]y enrolling a ‘critical mass’ of minority students,
we have ensured their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the Law School.” Id. at 828.
68 Id. at 826-28. The Law School gave considerable weight to the objective factors of an applicant’s
undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores. See id. at 827. The rationale for admitting students with lower scores was
that they “may help achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus make
a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.” Id. at 827. The law school hoped that “[b]y enrolling a
‘critical mass’ of minority students, we have ensured their ability to make unique contributions to the character
of the Law School.” Id. at 828. According to the Law School’s written policy, those who could offer varying
perspectives, including a concert pianist, someone who spoke five languages, or a member of an
underrepresented minority group, were considered for admission despite their low objective scores. Id. at 82627.
65
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School policy finding that it did not survive the strict scrutiny test. 69 In response to the
District Court decision, the Law School petitioned the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the
lower court. 70
The Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari in both the Grutter and Gratz
cases 71 Because the plaintiffs in each case challenged the respective affirmative action
admissions policies as violating the Equal Protection Clause, the Court reviewed each
policy under the strict scrutiny test. 72

The Court in both Grutter and Gratz swiftly

accepted, as binding, Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Bakke, and presumed that there
was a compelling governmental interest in achieving a diverse entering class. 73
The majority in Grutter upheld the Law School’s affirmative action policy.
Justice O’Connor, early pronouncement that “context matters” when reviewing racepreference governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause set the stage for
distinguishing its findings in these decision from those in the most recently considered
69 The District Court concluded that Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Bakke was not binding, and therefore
the Law School’s mission of admitting a diverse class was not a compelling governmental interest to justify
including race in the list of non-objective factors that could contribute to an applicant’s success. See id. at 84748. The court held that Bakke is not binding, because Justice Powell’s opinion was not joined by any other
Justices, and recent Supreme Court cases have not looked favorably on racial classifications. Id. at 844-46. The
court agreed that diversity does have important educational benefits, but felt that a distinction needs to be
drawn between viewpoint diversity and racial diversity. Id. at 849. The court felt that viewpoint diversity
provides benefits but that the connection between race and viewpoint is tenuous. Id. Therefore, racial
diversity is not a compelling interest. Id. at 850. The U.S. District Court further found that the admissions
policy was not narrowly tailored, concluding that the policy failed under the third prong of the narrowly
tailored test since the Law School’s goal of admitting a “critical mass” was practically indistinguishable from a
quota, and was such an amorphous figure that a program could never be narrowly tailored to achieve it. Id. at
850-51.
70 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 306.
(2003). The main issue before the Sixth Circuit was whether the District Court erred in concluding that Justice
Powell’s definition of a compelling governmental interest was binding. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 738-39.
71 Gratz, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002) (granting cert.); Grutter, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002) (granting cert.).
72 Gratz, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325. The policies, , would only withstand a constitutional
challenge if the schools could “demonstrate that the use of race in [their] current admissions program[s]
employ ‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.’” Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270
(quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
73 Despite all of the controversy and varying opinions among the lower courts, the Supreme Court did not
spend a significant amount of time addressing the issue in their opinion. The Court simply stated that “today
we endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the
use of race in university admissions.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.

13

cases of Wygant, Adarand and the like.

74

Justice O’Connor justified the different test as

permissible because, she wrote, “not every decision influenced by race is equally
objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining the importance and the sincerity of the governments reasons for using race in a
particular context.” 75
The Grutter majority reaffirmed Justice Powell’s conclusion in Bakke, that
achieving diversity in education supports a finding of a compelling governmental
interest. 76 It then turned its attention to whether the policy was narrowly tailored to meet
that interest. The majority acknowledged the need for a modified version of the Paradise
test, holding that the “inquiry must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use
of race to achieve student body diversity in public higher education.” 77 Consequently,
the Court found that it was perfectly appropriate for courts to fashion a unique narrowly
tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test in light of the particular context of the challenged
program. In this instance, the Court held, in order to more fairly in order to pass the
narrowly tailored test, the party defending an affirmative action admissions program need
only demonstrate that the program was flexible and non-mechanical, and limited in its
duration. 78 Ultimately, the Court found that the Law School program was not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. 79

74 Id. at 327; see also Jeramy R. Green, Affirmative Action: Challenges and Opportunities, 2004 BYU EDUC. L.J. 139,
149-151 (2004).
75 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
76 Id. “Attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that
‘good faith’ on the part of a university is ‘presumed’ absent [in] a showing to the contrary.” Id. at 330. “Skills
needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints.” Id. at 330.
77 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-34.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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In contrast, the Gratz Court struck down LSA’s admissions policy because it was
not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling governmental interest of achieving a diverse
student body. 80 LSA’s policy went beyond the spirit of Justice Powell’s edict that race
can be considered a factor in admissions, since it failed to allow for interpretation of
“individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes associated
with it.” 81

Therefore, the program was not narrowly drawn in a constitutionally

permissible way. 82
The Court clearly articulated the permissibility of fashioning a compelling governmental
interest test that was best suited for evaluating affirmative action policies aimed at
achieving diversity in institutes of higher education. Consequently, the Court can
evaluate a race-preference action against a test that is best suited to evaluate the particular

Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268-69. Before the Supreme Court addressed the merits of the case, they spent
considerable time discussing whether the plaintiff had standing to bring the case. Id. at 260-68 . In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens—who was joined by Justice Souter—contended that the case should be
dismissed because the plaintiff’s lacked standing. Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In reaching its conclusion,
the Supreme Court chose not to apply the four-pronged narrowly tailored test it had previously articulated in
Paradise.
81 Id. at 272 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324). Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected LSA’s argument that the policy’s
individual review system, which was triggered after the points were assigned, satisfied the Court’s requirement
that a narrowly tailored policy allow for individual review. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273-76. See generally, The Cost of
Good Intentions: Why the Supreme Court’s Decision Upholding Affirmative Action Admission Programs is
Detrimental to the Cause, 27 PACE L. REV. 15 (Fall 2006).
82 Id. at 275. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the fatal flaw in the University’s
admissions policy was its failure to provide an individual review of each candidate. Id. at 272-74. LSA’s policy
of automatically distributing 20 points to every applicant from the “under-represented minority” applicant pool
had the result of treating race as an absolute, which could jettison a member of an underrepresented group into
the accepted category, regardless of the experiences or qualities that race had contributed to the development
of the individual. Id. at 274. See also, (O’Connor, J., concurring) (witing that LSA’s practice of assigning points
to applicants merely because they are members of a particular class precluded the committee from considering
the effect race had on the individual, and his or her ability to contribute to meaningful class discussion.) Id. at
278-80 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, (Thomas, J., concurring). The
policy failed to permit admissions counselors the ability to identify and consider non-racial distinctions among
underrepresented minority applicants. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (finding that found LSA’s policy flawed
because “it awards all underrepresented minorities the same racial preference.”) Id. at 281. But see, (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter chose not to address the issue of whether LSA’s policy was narrowly tailored, and
criticized the rest of the Court for passing on that issue. According to Justice Souter, (the issue before the
Court was essentially moot because the Plaintiff who brought the suit was a transfer student, and not subject to
LSA’s entering class admissions policy.) Id. at 393; (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)(arguing that there is a compelling
need for such policies, and wide latitude should be given when interpreting whether the policies are narrowly
tailored. ) Id. at 302-03
80
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interest sought to be accomplished by a governmental entity. 83 The Court’s decision to
uphold the Law School’s policy not only identified for the first time a permissible
affirmative action policy in the context of education but it also gave the lower courts
license to design different “frameworks” for evaluating affirmative action policies
depending on the need for a particular program.
In 2005, in Johnson v. California, 84 Court concluded that the context in which a
policy is applied will dictate an appropriate definition of strict scrutiny. 85 The Johnson
court considered whether the strict scrutiny test applies to an Equal Protection challenge
to the California Department of Correction’s (CDC) “unwritten policy of racially
segregating prisoners in double cells in reception centers for up to 60 days each time they
enter a new correctional facility.” 86 Without reaching the merits, 87 the Court clearly
stated that “all racial classifications imposed by government must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny,” even when their effects equally burden or benefit
the members of the races involved. 88 The Court rejected CDC’s argument that it should
be exempt from a strict scrutiny analysis because prisoners are equally segregated. 89

Id. Justice O’Connor wrote that “not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable.” Id.
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
85 Summary Judgment granted for CDC and defendant appealed claiming that the District Court’s failure to
apply strict scrutiny was an inappropriate review. The Ninth Circuit recognized that in this case the standard of
review is paramanout but ultimately held that because this case considered the constituionaly right of prisoners,
a more deferential review was appropriate. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 2003); see Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that when a prison regulation infringes on an inmate’s constitutional
rights, the defending party need only show that the regulation is reasonably related to some legitimate
penalogical interest.) Id. at 89. but see, id at 100 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (writing
that a reasonableness standard fives prison officials too much discretion in determining what regulations to
impose.)
86 Id. at 502. Garrison Johnson, an African American inmate, brought suit against CDC. In every instance of
incarceration, Johson was placed in a double cell with another African American inmate. The CDC houses
Japanese-American inmates and Chinese Americans separately, as well as, Northern Hispanics and Southern
Hispanics. In each instance, the inmates were held for not more than 60 days.Id. The CDC justified this policy
as necessary to prevent gang violence. Id.
87 “We do not decide whether the CDC’s policy violates the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 505.
88 Id. at 505 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
89 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506.
83
84
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Although the Court did not define the what evidence might justify a compelling
governmental interest in dividing inmates by race, or evidence that CDC’s program was
narrowly tailored it held that “strict scrutiny applies in every context, “even for so-called
‘benign’ racial classifications, such as race conscious university admissions policies.” 90
The Court’s language suggests that a different strict scrutiny test might be appropriate for
evaluating a race-preference policy in the context of prisoner’s rights.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurrence with which Justices Souter and Breyer
joined. Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the Court that strict scrutiny properly applies to
any and all racial classifications. 91 Citing her opinions in Grutter and Gratz, Justice
Ginsberg held that “the same standard of review ought not to control judicial inspection
of every official race classification.” 92 In her opinion, actions aimed at ameliorating
present effects of past discrimination (actions designed to burden group’s long denied full
citizenship stature) 93 should be subject to a more exacting scrutiny than those measures
that are adopted as a result of the “after effects” of discrimination. 94 Under this analysis,
not only does context dictate a governmental entities justification for the compelling
governmental interest, it would dictate whether the strict scrutiny test was applicable at
all.
As a general matter, Courts considering Equal Protection Challenges to racepreference policies have only found compelling governmental interests in two instances,
Id. at 505 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
Johnson, 543 U.S. at 516 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
92 Id. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
93 Id. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
94 See id. at 516 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented writing that the CDC program violates the
Equal Protection clause under any test. Id. at 523 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, with whom Justice
Scalia joined in dissenting, wrote that “the Constitution has always demanded less within the prison walls,” and
for this reason, he would apply Turner’s less stringent deferential test. Id. at 524, 530 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
However, in reaching his conclusion, Justice Thomas was not without criticizing the majority for ruling in a
manner that contradicted its findings in Grutter and Gratz. See id. at 543 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
90
91
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where programs are aimed at ameliorating present effects of past discrimination in the
workplace, and where programs are aimed at creating a diverse learning environment in
the classroom. The Johnson opinion, particularly Justice Ginsburg’s finding that “the
same standard of review ought not to control judicial inspection of every official race
classification,” 95 suggests it is permissible to broaden acceptable findings of a compelling
governmental interest. As a result, the body of case law that considered Equal Protection
challenges to race-preference programs leaves room for lower courts to conclude that the
present strict scrutiny test can be even further reconstituted. As lower courts begin to
consider challenges beyond those programs that are created for the workplace or for
higher education, Justice O’Connor’s edict that “context matters” has arguably, opened a
pandora’s box, allowing courts define compelling governmental interests that best suit
their desired results
III. Lower Court evaluation of Race Preference Policies.
Scholars observing the Court’s evaluation of affirmative action admission policies
could easily argue that the Court neatly divided treatment of policies into two
categories. 96 When evaluating affirmative action policies in the workplace, the Court has
applied the Paradise test. When evaluating affirmative action for higher education, the
Court has applied the Grutter test. 97 The Johnson court’s holding, however, suggests that
when the context changes, so can the strict scrutiny test, even beyond these two neatly
fashioned groups. 98

Id. at 516 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Leslie Garfield, Back to Bakke: Defining the Strict Scrutiny Test for Affirmative Action Policies Aimed at
Achieving Diversity in the Classroom, 83 NEB. L. REV. 631 (2005).
97 See id.
98 Although the circuits seem to adhere to the Wygant/Paradise construct when considering affirmative action in
the workplace, recent district court decisions indicate that these courts recognize that the context of a particular
challenge does drive the strict scrutiny definition. Both the District Court of Florida and the District Court of
95
96

18

Recent decisions in the several circuits confirm that the Paradise “narrowly
tailored” test remains the controlling law when evaluating Equal Protection challenges to
affirmative action policies aimed at promoting diversity in the workplace. 99 In Dean v.
City of Shreveport, appellants, two white males to whom the Shreveport Fire Department
denied employment, challenged the fire department’s hiring process, which placed
applicants into separate lists according to race and sex. 100 The fire department policy,
which it adopted to comply with a Department of Justice consent decree issued by the
Department of Justice required the department to have the same proportion of blacks in
its department, “as blacks . . . bear to the appropriate work force in the particular
jurisdiction.” 101

Considering whether the District Court wrongly granted summary

judgment, the Fifth

Circuit held that remedying past discrimination is a compelling

government interest and thus the City met the first prong of the strict scrutiny test. The
Court remanded, however, for findings of whether the program was narrowly tailored. 102

Illinois have heard equal protection challenges to minority set aside programs within the context of the
construction industry. See, Hershell Gill Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Miami Dade County, Fla., 333 F. Supp 2d
1305 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that “context matters” and recognizing the difference in context between the
Grutter and Gratz decisions and the instant case. (“context [nevertheless] matters” when reviewing such
classifications under the Equal Protection Clause.” Citing Grutter 123 S.Ct. at 2338. The same goes for gender
preferences. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26, 102 S.Ct. 3331.”) Id. at 1326; See also Builders Ass’n of Greater
Chicago v. City of Chicago, 298 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill 2003)
99 See, e.g., Dean v. City of Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448, 464 (5th Cir. 2006); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dept.
of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 971 (8th Cir. 2003).
100 Dean, 438 F.3d at 452.
101 Id. at 459.
102 Id. In Biondo v. City of Chicago, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3463 (N.D. Ill. 2002), witness excluded by 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9816 (N.D. Ill. 2002), judgment entered by Cloud v. City of Chicago, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9817
(N.D. Ill. 2002), judgment vacated and remanded by Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2004), reh’g
denied and reh’g en banc denied by 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 20402 (2004), cert. denied by 543 U.S. 1152 (2005), the fire
department argued that its use of lists separating whites and minorities was in an effort to comply with federal
regulations that discouraged the use of standardized tests for promotions in strict sequence. Biondo, 382 F.3d at
683. The Biondo court rejected the City’s compelling government interest, highlighting that racial quotas would
be commonplace in public employment if preventing disparate impact by the use of a minorities only list
served a compelling government interest. See id. at 684. The court ultimately held that the fire department’s
practices did not pass strict scrutiny. Id. In one of the most recent cases, Kohlbek v. City of Omaha, Neb., 447
F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006), the Eighth Circuit held that an affirmative action plan that considered race for
promotional decisions was not narrowly tailored because the use of racial classifications applied in instances
where there was no identified past discrimination. Id. at 556. In the narrowly tailored analysis, the Kohlbek court
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Relying on the Wygant/Paradise strict scrutiny test, the Eighth Circuit in
Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota Dept. of Transportation. 103 concluded that the
Transportation Equity Act (TEA) did not violate equal protection as applied in the states
of Minnesota and Nebraska. Plaintiffs in Sherbrooke challenged the constitutionality of
the TEA, which authorizes the use of race-preference preferences in federally funded
transportation contracts. 104 The circuit court found a compelling government interest in
ensuring that government funding was not distributed in a fashion that perpetuated the
effects of discrimination in the transportation contracting industry. Applying the Paradise
factors, the court further concluded that the TEA was narrowly tailored based on the
states’ findings. As a result, the act, as applied, passed constitutional muster. 105
The circuits seem to adopt the Grutter narrowly tailored test when evaluating
affirmative action admission policies used to create a diverse classroom environment. 106
The Ninth Circuit determined the law school admissions policy at the University of
Washington was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest of educational
diversity in Smith v. University of Washington. 107 In deciding the case, the Smith court

considered the following factors set forth in Paradise: “ efficacy of alternative remedies, the flexibility and
duration of the race-conscious remedy, the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market, and
the impact of the remedy on third parties.” Id. at 555 (citing Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 971).
103 Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d 964.
104 W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. State Dept. of Transp., 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied by sub nom.
City of Vancouver v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 1332 (2006), on remand to sub nom. W. States Paving Co., Inc. v.
Washington State Dept. of Transp., No. C00-5204 RBL, 2006 WL 1734163 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2006);
Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d 964.
105 Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d 964. The Court was particularly comfortable with the relationship between the
numerical goals and the relevant labor market; by focusing on the statistical evidence provided by the states. Id.
at 973-974; see also, W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d 983 (finding that there was not sufficient evidence
demonstrating that minorities suffer or have suffered discrimination in the Washington transportation
contracting industry and concluding that the TEA as applied in the state of Washington was not narrowly
tailored).
106 Smith v. University of Washington, 923 F.3d 367; but see, Hopwood v. Texas78 F.3d 932 (C.A.5 1996)
(Hopwood I) (holding that diversity is not a compelling state interest)
107 Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 2004). For the relevant years, the law school received
approximately 2,000 applications for 165 positions. Id. at 370. The top 250-300 applicants based on
undergraduate grade point average and LSAT score were considered “presumptive admits.” Id. The remaining

20

performed an extensive analysis of the Grutter decision, explaining that the University of
Michigan Law School’s admissions policy provided a template for an admissions plan
that passed constitutional muster. 108
Plaintiffs in Smith argued that the law school’s admissions policy was not
narrowly tailored because (1) the admissions office supposedly sent an “ethnicity
substantiation letter” to some minority applicants, 109 (2) application evaluators gave
Asian Americans a plus, 110 and (3) a large number of white applicants were referred to
the Admissions Committee as opposed to being admitted directly by an administrator. 111
The court addressed each of these arguments and ultimately rejected them finding that the

applicants were considered “presumptive denies.” Id. Presumptive admits were reviewed by the admissions
coordinator and were either admitted or referred to the Admissions Committee for further consideration. Id.
The presumptive denies were reviewed by the assistant dean who either admitted, denied, or referred applicants
to an Admissions Committee. Id. The Admissions Committee ranked the top 250 to 300 candidates requiring
committee referral, and the top picks were admitted. Id.
108 Id. at 372.
109 The law school sent an ethnicity substantiation letter to some applicants who identified themselves as
minorities on their application. Id. at 376-77. The letter asked applicants to provide additional information on
“family background (including country of origin), languages spoken, official or governmental status (for Native
Americas), and cultural activities and associations.” Id. at 377. The school argued this information was used to
ascertain whether the applicant’s race or ethnicity should be considered a plus factor. Id. The court held that the
letter allowed the school to give preference to those minority students whose race had made a significant
impact on their lives, rather than giving preference to minority students based solely on race. Id. The court
concluded that the letter supported, rather than undermined, the constitutionality of the admissions program.
Id.
110 The plaintiffs further argued that the school’s plan was not narrowly tailored since Asian Americans were
given a plus, and the school could have attracted a critical mass of Asian American students (7-9%) without the
plus. Id. at 378. The court rejected this argument and deferred to the school’s interest in achieving diversity
among Asian Americans for its preeminent Asian law program. Id. The court further noted that Grutter did not
establish a number or range of percentages that constituted a critical mass, and the plaintiffs did not provide
any support that critical mass is achieved at 7-9%. Id. at 379. The court concluded the admissions policy was
not unconstitutional simply because Asian Americans were given a plus. Id.
111 Id. at 370. Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that the plan was not narrowly tailored since a large number of white
applicants were referred to the Admissions Committee rather than being directly admitted by an administrator.
Id. at 380. In 1994, 22 minority only applications were pulled from the discretionary group that was supposed to
be sent to the Admissions Committee. Id. While the court said this was suspect on its face, the school provided
a reasonable explanation - to make an expedited decision and actively recruit these minority students. Id.
Notably, the school abandoned this practice after 1994 because it was unsuccessful. Id. The court further
concluded that it was not surprising that a large number of white applicants were sent to the Admissions
Committee rather than being directly admitted since white applicants were approximately 69-74% of total
applicants. Id. at 381. Moreover, applicants sent to the Admissions Committee were not at a disadvantage since
they received an additional holistic review of their application. Id. Thus, the law school’s system of review did
not establish a constitutional violation of equal protection, and the court affirmed the district court’s ruling. Id.
at 382.
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law school’s admissions program was narrowly tailored to serve the school’s compelling
interest in attaining a diverse student body. 112
The most problematic cases concerning the “context matters” language are recent
cases in the circuit courts that concern affirmative action admission policies in
elementary and secondary education. 113 The circuit courts in these cases have used the
context matters language of Grutter to justify the use of a strict scrutiny test that is
distinct from the Supreme Court’s test it used for evaluating affirmative action admission
policies in higher education. This dichotomy is troublesome because it suggests that
courts will further splinter affirmative action challenges, currently segregated by
workplace and education into even smaller subsets in the educational arena.
In Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, the First Circuit upheld a voluntary racepreference transfer policy for elementary and secondary public schools. 114 Parents of
Lynn Massachusetts School children challenged the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act
(RIA), which took race into account when determining a student’s ability to transfer out
of a neighborhood school. 115 Students were permitted to make desegregative transfers; 116
students were not permitted to make segregative transfers. If a transfer request was
denied, a student had the opportunity to appeal. 117 Given its structure, the Lynn School

Id. “…the program was not rendered violative of the Equal Protection clause because of the school’s use of
an “ethnicity substantiation letter,” id. at 377; “awarding preference to Asian applicants did not violate the equal
protection clause” id. at 379-380; and a “separate track” procedure for “discretionary” applicants did not violate
the equal protection clause.” Id. at 381.
113 Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Disc., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 2004).
114 Comfort, 418 F.3d at 6.
115 Id. at 7.
116 Id. at 8. Desegregative transfers allow for a white student to transfer out of a racially isolated school and into
a racially imbalanced school or for a nonwhite student to transfer out of a racially imbalanced school and into a
racially isolated school. Id.
117 Id. Successful appeals often involve medical concerns, safety issues, and the prevention of siblings in
separate schools. Id. Approximately half of all appeals are granted. Id.
112
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District’s implementation of the RIA had the possibility of resulting in the unequal
treatment of students based solely on race. 118
In challenging the RIA, plaintiff’s argued that the Grutter definition of a
compelling governmental interest was inapplicable since the Grutter Court considered
diversity in the context of higher education, which supported a compelling governmental
interest in “viewpoint diversity.” 119

The benefits of viewpoint diversity, plaintiff’s

argued, did not flow to racial diversity in the context of elementary and secondary
education. 120

The court rejected this argument, noting that there is no basis for

concluding the benefits of racial diversity are limited to viewpoint diversity or that these
benefits are stronger in higher education.121 The differences do not negate a compelling
government interest; rather, they are the “logical result of context.” 122 Using Grutter as
an analytical framework, the court upheld the Lynn plan. 123
In his concurring opinion, Judge Boudin noted that the Lynn Plan was
substantially different from almost anything that the Supreme Court has previously
addressed and therefore, the context was different than that of the Grutter and Gratz
decisions. The Lynn Plan was adopted to promote student safety and attendance, where

Id. In the following example, a white student and an African-American student are assigned to the same
“racially isolated” neighborhood school. Id. If both students request a transfer to a racially imbalanced school,
the white student will be allowed to transfer, and the African-American student will not be allowed to transfer.
Id.
119 Id. at 16. See supra note __. .
120 Id. at 15 (citing McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 852-53 (W.D. Ky. 2004)).
121 See Comfort, 418 F.3d at 15.
122 Id. at 16. “But it is natural that safety and attendance issues will loom larger in elementary and secondary
schools than in graduate schools. Conversely, lively classroom discussion is a more central form of learning in
law schools (which prefer the Socratic method) than in a K-12 setting. These differences do not negate a
compelling interest in racial diversity in a K-12 setting. Instead, they are the logical result of context.” Id.
123 Id. at 22. Applying the strict scrutiny test, the court found a compelling government interest in the
educational benefits of a diverse student body and that the program was narrowly tailored because it did not
pursue a quota, did not “unduly harm members of any racial group;” and monitors demographics for diversity
in order to uphold the durational requirement mandated by Grutter.. Id.
118

23

as the graduate school programs were adopted to promote “viewpoint diversity.” 124
“Where the outcome in the Supreme Court is uncertain and past pronouncements were
made in contexts different than the [context] now presented,” he wrote, “the appellate
court must exercise its own judgment on whether the local plan is constitutionally
forbidden.” 125 Because the Court had not yet considered a constitutional challenge to a
voluntary race-preference transfer policy for elementary and secondary schools, Judge
Boudin looked to Grutter and Gratz to “provide some guidance for our narrow tailoring
inquiry into the use of race to obtain the educational benefits of diversity” 126 agreeing
with the majority that the plan was narrowly tailored. 127
In 2004, parents 128 of students enrolled in the Jefferson County Public Schools
System (JCPS) in Jefferson County, Kentucky challenged the 2001 JCPS school
assignment plan (Jefferson County BOE plan) as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. 129 In essence, the plan allowed students to choose between residential based
schools (“resides schools), 130 traditional magnet schools, 131 and non-traditional magnet
See id. at 16-18.
Id. at 28.
126 Id. at 17.
127 Id. at 18. The Judge cited the plurality opinion of Paradise, where the requirements of narrow tailoring
included requiring “…the proponent to show that a plan or practice is (i) necessary to the declared purpose, (ii)
proportional to the declared purpose, and (iii) not more burdensome than necessary on third parties.” Id.at 16
(citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987)).
128 Plaintiff David McFarland filed on behalf on his two sons, Stephen and Daniel; both were denied entry to
traditional schools. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 838 n. 3 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
Plaintiff Ronald Pittenger filed on behalf on his son Brandon, who was denied entry to a traditional school. Id.
Plaintiff Anthony Underwood filed on behalf of his son Kenneth Maxwell Aubrey, who was denied entry to a
traditional school. Id. Plaintiff Crystal Meredith filed on behalf of her son Joshua McDonald, who was unable
to enroll in his resides school because it was filled to capacity; he was assigned to Young school, and applied
for a transfer to Bloom school that was not in his assigned cluster. Id. He was denied admittance because it
would have had an adverse effect on the racial composition of the original school he was attending. Id. The
Court held that the traditional school selection process was unconstitutional, id. at 838, but because the court
held that none of the Plaintiffs who were denied entry to the traditional schools had proven they were injured
by the race selection process, it was only Meredith, whose son was not affected by the traditional schools, who
appealed. McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005).
129 McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 836.
130 Geographic boundaries have significant impact on determining where most students will be assigned to
school. Id. at 842. Except for Central, duPont Manual and YPAS, Male and Butler high schools, the Brown
124
125
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schools. 132 JCPS originally adopted the plan in 1973 in response to the Sixth Circuit
mandate that they adopt a school board integration plan. 133 The plan continued in many
incarnations until June 2000 when the United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky dissolved the desegregation decree. 134 As part of the court’s ruling,
JCPS was ordered to stop using racial quotas and to redesign admission to its magnet
schools prior to commencement of the 2002-2003 school year. 135 In response to the
court’s order, the school board ended its use of racial quotas 136 and after considering
public feedback the board adopted the 2001 Plan. 137
Although the plan has many aspects, the part of the plan that is the subject of the
Equal Protection challenge concerns selection for traditional schools, which admitted
students by application. 138 The district initially selected students for kindergarten spots
School, Brandeis Elementary, and the traditional programs at Foster and Maupin, each JCPS school has a
“resides area”, and, based on the residence of their parent or guardian, each student is assigned to a “resides
school”. Id. The non-magnet elementary schools are grouped into twelve clusters. Id. Each student has a
designated “cluster resides schools” which includes the resides school for that students. Id. The clusters were
designed so that they would produce populations within the racial guidelines. Id. There are no clusters for the
non-magnet middle and high schools and each has its own resides area. Id. at 843. The only selection criteria
for any student’s admission to his or her resides school or a school within the cluster are age, completion of the
previous grade, and residence. Id.
131 There are nine traditional magnet schools. Id. These schools offer the regular curriculum in a particular
environment and are not considered resides schools, even though students may only apply to most of the
schools based on place of residence, because all students must apply to gain admission. Id.
132 There are four non-traditional magnet schools. Id. They do not have a resides area, so any student is eligible
to apply. Id. These schools offer specialized programs and curricula. Id. There are also eighteen magnet
programs (small specialized programs within regular schools), as well as optional programs in twenty-two
schools, (small programs with unique attributes). Id. Resides area is not taken into account for these two
programs. Id. Additionally, there are magnet career academies at the high school level which offer programs
concentrated in a technical career. Id. Students must apply to the magnet program at these high schools.
Thirteen are resides schools and one is not. Id.
133 Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County, 489 F.2d 925, 932 (6th Cir. 1973).
134 Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. Of Educ., 102 F. Supp.2d 358, 377-81 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
135 McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 841.
136 The Board stopped using quotas at Central High School and at three magnet schools, including DuPont
Manual High School (which included the Youth Performing Arts School), the Brown School, and Brandeis
Elementary. Id. The Board concluded that the Court’s order did not include magnet traditional schools. Id.
137 Id. The stated missions of the 2001 plan is to provide “‘substantial uniform educational resources to all
students’ and to teach basic skills and critical thinking ‘in a racially integrated environment.’” Id. at 840.
138
Traditional schools offer the same comprehensive curriculum as other non-magnet schools but they
emphasize “basic skills in a highly structured educational environment” and demand strong parent
involvement. Id. at 846. The traditional program is offered at certain JCPS elementary, middle and high schools.
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in the traditional program based on place of residence and random draw lists. The Board
composed the random draw list of random applicants to the traditional school, who are
randomly sorted into four lists at each grade level, Black Male, Black Female, White
Male and White Female. 139 The Office of Demographics reviews the principal’s
selection to guarantee the school meets the racial guidelines and gives final approval. 140
At the outset, the district court made clear that the 2001 plan was subject to the
strict scrutiny standard of review. 141 The court recognized that context matters in
deciding whether JCPS identified a compelling governmental interest. And while the
context of public elementary and secondary education differs from that of higher
education, the court concluded that “the educational benefits of a diverse student body”
remain the same. 142 For this reason, the Court measured the program against the
analytical framework annunciated in Grutter and Gratz. 143 In evaluating the JCPS
program, however, the Court observed that deference must be granted to local school
Id. at 841. Under the complicated plan, students have the potential to choose the school they will attend at the
elementary, middle and high school level. JCPS schools are divided into traditional schools, magnet schools,
non-traditional magnet schools and option schools. At the elementary school and middle school level, students
are assigned a choice of schools within their “resides area,” which is the geographic area in which the student’s
parent(s) or guardian lives. Each student may choose from one of several “resides schools” within his or her
“resides area.” Students have the choice of selecting a traditional or non-traditional magnet school. Students
who do not choose to select a school are assigned to the “resides school” in the student’s resides area.
Administrators, in consultation with school principals jointly determine school assignments based on student
choices, available space and racial guidelines. Id. at 842-43.
139 Once students are selected for the traditional program in kindergarten, they are guaranteed a place in the
traditional school program for each continuing year, should they choose to elect to remain in the program. Id.
at 846. These students become the “pipeline” for the program. Id. The pipeline increases each year after
kindergarten – through the first year of High School. Id. at 846-47. After the schools fill their slots from
students in the pipeline, the principle has discretion to draw candidates from the different random draw lists to
fill the additional available slots. Id. at 847. The principal makes his or her selection in a manner that assures the
school will stay within the racial guidelines for the entire school population. Id.
140 Id. at 847. If students are not selected for a traditional school in one year, they may reapply to try to join the
pipeline for the following year. Id.
141 Id. at 848. The court wrote, however, that this case was distinguishable from Grutter and Gratz, but applied
strict scrutiny none-the less. Id. at 848.
142 Id. at 849 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). “The historical importance of the deference
accorded to local school boards goes to the heart of our democratic form of government. It is conceptually
different, though more accepted than the defense discussed in Grutter and Bakke.” McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at
850.
143 See, id. at 856, 858.
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boards, which act in a democratic way to preserve the essence of primary school
education, best executed at the local level. 144 The Court ultimately concluded that the
2001 Plan for assigning students to traditional schools failed. The plan was not narrowly
tailored because “(1) the assignment process put Black and White applicants on separate
assignment tracks and (2) the use of the separate lists appeared completely unnecessary to
accomplish the Board’s goals.” 145
Ultimately, the court held that if JCPS struck down the portion of the plan that
divided applicants to traditional schools by race, it could maintain the rest of the plan.
Furthermore, the court found that none of the children whose parents challenged the 2001
Plan were entitled to relief since “equity does not require the Plaintiff’s children be
admitted to the school of their choice in the upcoming year, and like all other JCPS
students, [plaintiff’s children] may reapply for admission to a traditional school for the
[upcoming academic year.]” 146 Plaintiff Meredith, on behalf of her daughter Crystal,
appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which, per curium, held that the “well reasoned” district
court opinion should stand. 147
In Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) v. Seattle School District No.
1, 148 PICS challenged a city program aimed at achieving diversity in its 10 public high

Id. at 851.
Id. at 852, “The process is more like the program that was objectionable in affirmative action admission
programs of Gratz and Bakke than like the use of race as a tipping factor, which the court found permissible in
Grutter.” Id.
146 Id. at 864. Plaintiff McFarland’s children were enrolled in a traditional school at the time of the ruling,
making their request for injunctive relief moot. Id. Plaintiffs Pittenger and Underwood have not proved that
their children were denied admission to a traditional school based solely on their race, nor did their children
reapply to the traditional program. Id. at 864..
147 McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513, 513 (6th Cir. 2005).
148 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001), rev’d,
285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002), injunction granted, No. 01-35450, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7678, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr.
26, 2002), reh’g granted, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002), certifying questions to Washington Supreme Court, 294 F.3d
1085 (9th Cir. 2002), certified questions answered, 72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003), rev’d, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g
granted en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, No. 05-908, 2006
144

145
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schools. The City of Seattle School District (the District) maintains a voluntary open
choice policy for its 10 high schools. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, high school
assignment was based solely on the students’ residential neighborhood.

Assigning

students based on neighborhood resulted in de facto segregation in the schools, yielding a
disproportionate mix among African American, Asian American, Latino and Native
American students. 149
In an effort to diversify its high schools, the District allocated the available spaces
in its high schools by choice. 150 A majority of students choose the same five schools and
when a school is oversubscribed, the District chooses who shall attend that school based
on a series of four tiebreakers. 151 The first tiebreaker is the sibling tiebreaker and gives a
ninth grader priority to enter a school if he or she has a sibling at that school. 152 The
second tiebreaker, and the one over which PICS brought suit, is considered the racepreference tiebreaker.

The race-preference tiebreaker allows the District to select

students whose race will mitigate the imbalance of the racial makeup of the selected
school. 153

U.S. LEXIS 4349, at *1 (June 5, 2006).
149 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1166. Approximately 70 percent of Seattle residents are white,
and approximately 30 percent are nonwhite. Id. Seattle’s public school system students are approximately 40
percent white and 60 percent nonwhite. Id. The majority of Seattle’s white public school students live north of
downtown. Id. The majority of Seattle’s nonwhite public school students live south of downtown, including
approximately 84 percent of all African American students, 74 percent of all Asian American students, 65
percent of all Latino students, and 51 percent of all Native American students. Id.
150 Id. at 1168. A majority of the city’s nonwhite students live south of downtown, and as a result, the schools
located in those neighborhoods were disproportionately segregated. See Id. at 1166. The district responded to
this because of an historic struggle with racial isolation among its individual neighborhoods. Id. Students list
the high school they would like to attend in order of preference. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 137 F. Supp. 2d.
at 1226. Approximately 82 percent of students entering high school in 2000 selected one of five schools as their
first choice. Id.
151 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1169.
152 Id. Fifteen to 20 percent of admissions to the ninth grade class are a result of the sibling tiebreaker. Id.
153 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 137 F. Supp. 2d. at 1226. A school is out of balance if it deviates by more than
15% from the overall racial breakdown of the population of students attending Seattle’s public schools (40%
white/60% nonwhite). Id. If not for the tiebreaker preference, the school district would be de facto segregated
due to residential patterns. See id. The district estimated that without the racial tiebreaker preference, the
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PICS brought both a state law action and a federal law action in Federal District
Court claiming that the racial tiebreaker preference violated the Washington Civil Rights
Act, called Initiative 200, which provides that the state government, including school
districts, may not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of …
public education. 154 PICS further claimed that the race-preference tiebreaker violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution and Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 155

nonwhite student populations of the 2000-2001 ninth grade class would have been 79.2 percent at Franklin,
30.5 percent at Hale, 33 percent at Ballard, and 41.1 percent at Roosevelt. Id. Utilizing the racial tiebreaker
preference, the nonwhite student populations for the 2000-2001 ninth grade class were 59.5 percent at
Franklin, 40.6 percent at Hale, 54.2 percent at Ballard, and 55.3 percent at Roosevelt. Id. Approximately 3,000
students entered Seattle high schools in the 2000-2001 school year, and approximately 300 were assigned to an
oversubscribed high school as a result of the racial tiebreaker preference. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d
at 1170. In the third tiebreaker, distance of the student’s home to the school is measured, distance is calculated
within 1/100 of a mile, and the closest students are admitted first. Id. at 1170. The distance tiebreaker
accounts for approximately 70 to 75 percent of ninth grade admissions. Id. The fourth tiebreaker utilizes a
lottery system to allocate the remaining seats. Id. The lottery tiebreaker is “virtually never used” since the
distance tiebreaker assigns nearly all of the students. Id.
154 Id. at 1227. In 1998, Washington voters passed Initiative 200, the Washington Civil Rights Act. Id.
Initiative 200 is codified at Washington Revised Code Annotated section 49.60.400. Id. at 1226. Section
49.60.400 declares that “the state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2006).
155

Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1226.
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The District Court found in favor of the District on both claims. 156 PICS appealed
the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit
invalidated the racial tiebreaker preference as violative of Initiative 200. 157 Following a
subsequent tour through state and federal courts, 158 the Court of Appeals considered
whether the District’s use of the race-preference tiebreaker in the open choice, noncompetitive high school assignment plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution. 159
Citing Johnson, Grutter and Adarand, Judge Fisher, writing for the Majority, 160
concluded that it would uphold the policy if the District could prove that there was a
156

As to the State claim, the court found “a duty to construe Initiative 200, if possible, in a way that makes the
initiative consistent with state and federal constitutions.” Id. The authority to use race to provide a “general and
uniform system of public schools,” interpreted by the courts to mean racially integrated schools, is an authority
granted by the Washington Constitution. Id. at 1228. Application of Initiative 200 to the tiebreaker preference,
therefore, would impermissibly effect an amendment to the state constitution. Id. at 1227. The state claim was a
matter of first impression since Initiative 200 had not yet been construed by the Washington Supreme Court.
Id. The Court had to predict how the state’s highest court would apply Initiative 200. Id. (citing Comm’r v.
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967)). The Court evaluated the federal claim under the strict scrutiny test.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1232. The Court found as a matter of law a compelling governmental
interest in “achieving racial diversity and mitigating the effects of de facto residential segregation…” Id. at 1235.
The Court further held that the racial tiebreaker preference was narrowly tailored. See id. at 1239. The racepreference tiebreaker only applies to schools deemed out of balance. Id. at 1238. When the entering class of the
school is balanced, the District abandons the use of race assignments to that school and will not use race to
assign the remaining spaces in the school. Id. Moreover, the plan is sound since it utilizes a 60/40 plan and
allows a 15% deviation from those numbers. Id. The Court concluded that the racial tiebreaker passed strict
scrutiny. See id. at 1240.
157 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002). Law codified at
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2006).

158 Following the Court’s decision to uphold the district plan, Parents Involved in Community Schools
appealed. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 285 F.3d at 1243. The Court granted an injunction, and the District was
prohibited from using the racial tiebreaker in making high school assignments. Id. at 1256. Applying state law,
the Court found the tiebreaker violated Washington law. Id. at 1253 (citing § 49.60.400). Following reversal,
withdrawal of opinion on grant of rehearing, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 294
F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002), and certification of question to the Supreme Court of Washington, the Supreme
Court of Washington issued an answer to the certified question. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Disc. No. 1, 72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003). .The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to
issue an injunction. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 989 (9th Cir.
2004).
159 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1166.
160 Chief Judge Schroeder and Judges Pregerson, Hawkins, W. Fletcher, and Rawlinson joined the majority
opinion. Id. at 1166. Judge Kozinski concurred in the result; however, Judge Kozinski opined that the issue
before the Court was “fundamentally different from almost anything that the Supreme Court has previously
addressed.” Id. at 1193 (Kozinski, J., concurring). See infra note 50 Judge Bea, joined by Judges Kleinfeld,
Tallman, and Callahan, dissented. Id. at 1196 (Bea, J., dissenting).
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compelling governmental interest in adopting the policy and that the policy was narrowly
tailored to meet that interest. 161 The Majority noted early in the decision that “context
matters” 162 and therefore, defined both the compelling governmental interest test and the
narrowly tailored test in a manner consistent with the education-based test outlined by the
Supreme Court in Grutter and Gratz. 163 However, the Court also required the District to
prove that the policy seeks to avoid the harms that result from racially concentrated
schools. 164 The Court, however employed the five-prong “education based” narrowly
tailored test as outlined in Grutter and Gratz. 165
In evaluating the compelling governmental interest, the Court recognized the
affirmative educational and societal benefits that flow from racial diversity. 166 Judge
Fisher wrote that these interests are similar to the interests set forth in Grutter, yet the
contextual differences are significant. Grutter noted the importance in higher education
to prepare students for “work and citizenship,” 167 and Judge Fisher opined that “public
secondary schools have an equal if not more important role in this preparation.” 168
Nevertheless, the Court still found a compelling governmental interest in the District’s

Id. at 1166.
Id. at 1173 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (“[c]ontext matters when reviewing racepreference governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.”)).
163 Id. at 1180.
164 Id. at 1174.
165 Id. at 1174. The Court would only uphold the policy if the racial tiebreaker met the following conditions: (1)
an individualized consideration of applicants, (2) the absence of quotas, (3) serious, good faith consideration of
race-neutral alternatives to the affirmative action program, (4) no member of any racial group was unduly
harmed, and (5) the program had a sunset provision or some other end point. Id.
166 Id. at 1175. At trial, expert testimony established the following benefits: “improved critical thinking skills,”
“socialization and citizenship advantages of racially diverse schools,” and opportunities to network in areas of
higher education and employment. Id.
167 Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003)).
168 Id.
161
162
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goals. 169 The Court further found that the Program’s use of a raced based tie-breaker was
narrowly tailored and therefore was constitutionally permissible. 170
Judge Kozinski wrote a concurring opinion that challenged the wisdom of
applying the Supreme Court’s Grutter/Gratz strict scrutiny test to a case concerning a
race-preference policy aimed at achieving diversity in secondary school. 171

He

analogized the Majority’s application of the Grutter/Gratz strict scrutiny test to pounding
square pegs into round holes. 172 In Judge Kozinski’s opinion, context clearly matters,
and there are meaningful differences when the government seeks racial classifications to
oppress blacks or other minorities 173 as opposed to teaching children how to deal

Id. The Court also found a compelling government interest in avoiding the harms that result from racially
concentrated schools. Id. at 1180. In furtherance of that interest, the District is entitled to pursue the benefits
of racial diversity and avoid the harms of segregation in the absence of a court order deeming it in violation of
the Constitution. Id. at 1179. This entitlement is derived from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
where the court referenced the voluntary integration of schools as “sound educational policy within the
discretion of local school officials.” Id. (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971)).
170 The Court first considered the individualized evaluation of each applicant. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426
F.3d at 1180. The Court found that this prong of the test was not totally relevant in the current context since
there was no competition issue, unlike Grutter and Gratz. See id. More importantly, since race itself is the
relevant consideration when curing de facto segregation, the tiebreaker preference “must necessarily focus on
the race of its students.” Id. at 1183 (citing Comfort v. Lynn Sch.Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005). For
these reasons, the district need not conduct an individualized consideration of each student since the plan is
otherwise narrowly tailored. See Parents Involved in Cmty.Schs., 426 F.3d at 1183.
The Court then turned to the absence of quotas and found that the 15% plus/minus variance is not a
quota because it does not reserve a fixed number of spots for students based on race. Id. at 1184. The District
seeks to enroll a critical mass of white/nonwhite students in its oversubscribed schools to reach its compelling
interests. Id. The 15% plus/minus variance is a goal rather than a rigid ratio. See id. at 1186. The Court found
that the tiebreaker policy was necessary and the most race neutral alternative since the tiebreaker preference
allows the realization of the compelling interests and discourages a return to enrollment patterns based on
racially segregated housing patterns. See id. at 1187. Here, as in Grutter, the Court deferred to the District’s
judgment in evaluating race neutral alternatives. See id. at 1188.
Concerning the fourth prong, the Court found that the policy did not create undue harm because “(1)
the District is entitled to assign all students to any of its schools, (2) no student is entitled to attend any specific
school and (3) the tiebreaker does not uniformly benefit any race or group of individuals to the detriment of
another…” Id. at 1192. Finally, the Court had no issue with the sunset provision that Justice O’Connor, writing
in Grutter, found essential to the viability of any race-preference policy. See id. In this instance, the District
reviews the plan annually and is responsive to choice patterns and constituents’ concerns. Id. The Court shares
O’Connor’s hope in Grutter that in 25 years, racial preferences will no longer be necessary. Id.
171 See id. at 1193 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
172 Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring).
173 Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring).
169
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respectfully and collegially with their peers during their formative years. 174 Further, he
wrote, the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny tests have been more reactive than proactive,
changing definitional course in response to the context of each issue presented. 175 For
these reason, the plan should be evaluated under a rational basis standard of review.
Specifically, he would employ a “robust and realistic rational basis review…where courts
consider the actual reasons for the plan in light of the real-world circumstances giving
rise to it.” 176
Justice Kozinski concluded that the Seattle Plan is far from the original evils at
which the Fourteenth Amendment was addressed. 177 Rather, it gives “the American
Melting Pot a healthy stir” without benefiting any group. 178 For this reason, Judge
Kozinski would leave the decision to those in charge, namely local officials, and
therefore, affirm the decision of the district court.
Judge Bea, joined by three other judges, wrote a strong dissent. 179 Judge Bea
rejected the Grutter court’s definition of a compelling governmental interest, writing that

Id. at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
See id. at 1195 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Comparing this case to past Supreme Court decisions, Judge
Kozinski noted that “the Seattle plan carries none of the baggage the Supreme Court has found objectionable
in cases where it has applied strict scrutiny.” Id. at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring) “[The] plan at issue . . . is
fundamentally different from almost anything that the Supreme Court has previously addressed. It is not, like
old-fashioned racial discrimination laws, aimed at oppressing blacks…”. Id. at 1193 (Kozinski, J., concurring)
(quoting Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, 418 F.3d 1, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring)). Unlike
modern affirmative action, the plan does not “give one racial group an edge over another.” Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1193 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (quoting Comfort, 418 F.3d at 27 (Boudin, C.J.,
concurring)). “The plan does not segregate persons by race.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at
1193.(Kozinski, J., concurring) (quoting Comfort, 418 F.3d at 27 (Boudin, C.J., concurring)). The plan does
not involve racial quotas. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1193 (quoting Comfort, 418 F.3d at 27
(Boudin, C.J., concurring)). “These are meaningful differences.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1193.
176 Id. at 1194 (citation omitted); see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)
(holding that the “[S]tate may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to
174
175

render the distinction arbitrary or irrational” (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1982); U.S. Dept. of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973)).

Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1195 (quoting Comfort, 418 F.3d at 29 (Boudin, C.J., concurring)).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1196.
179 See id. at 1196-1222 (Bea, J., dissenting).
177
178
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the case is not about the right to be educated in a racially diverse academic setting. 180
Rather, according to Judge Bea, the case issue was whether the government can impose
on students the decision to be educated in a diverse setting. 181 According to Judge Bea,
the District’s plan was nothing more than racial balancing, based on quotas and, must,
therefore be struck down. 182
Judge Bea essentially accused the majority of gerrymandering the strict scrutiny
test to fit its desired goal. 183 The Majority’s reliance on Grutter was inappropriate since
in that case, the court recognized that there were a host of factors, race being one of them,
to which a candidate for admission in the law school can bring to a classroom. 184 In
contrast, the Seattle plan merely focused on race, and focused on such in a large context,
not just for an individual. 185

Ultimately, Judge Bea agreed with Judge Kozinski that

context matters and wrote that the Grutter case was limited in its precedential weight to

Id. 1196 (Bea, J., dissenting).
At the outset, it is important to note what this case is not about. The idea that children
will gain social, civic, and perhaps educational skills by attending schools with a proportion
of students of other ethnicities and races, which proportion reflects the world in which they
will move, is a notion grounded in common sense. It may be generally, if not universally,
accepted. But that is not the issue here.
Id. at 1196 (Bea, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 1196 (Bea, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 1202 (Bea, J., dissenting). Judge Bea opined that the Grutter diversity interest pursued “genuine
diversity” in the student body, where race was considered as a single plus factor among many factors. Id. (Bea,
J., dissenting). Here, the District pursues a diversity interest which considers solely racial diversity, specifically a
predefined grouping of races in the schools. Id. (Bea, J., dissenting). The District’s interest is not a valid
compelling interest and violates equal protection. Id. (Bea, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 1198 (Bea, J., dissenting). Judge Bea held that the majority and concurring opinions tried to distinguish
past Supreme Court cases by focusing on the effects of discrimination rather than the fact of discrimination.
Id. (Bea, J., dissenting). This allowed the majority and concurring opinions to create two categories
distinguishing the Seattle plan: “(1) the effects of other race discrimination plans were much worse than Seattle’s
and (2) the effects were visited on certain races.” Id. (Bea, J., dissenting). Judge Bea concluded, however, that
these differences are irrelevant because “there is no de minimis exception to the Equal Protection Clause.” Id.
(Bea, J., dissenting) (citing Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 712 (9th Cir. 1997)).
Additionally, equal protection protects the rights of individuals, not the rights of certain races or groups. Id.
(Bea, J., dissenting). Judge Bea further wrote that not calling the Seattle’s plan a quota does not make it
something other than a quota – the quota is the percentage by which the particular school’s racial imbalance
differs from the District’s target. Id. “A rose by any other name…etc.” Id.
184 Id. at 1202.
185 Id.
180
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decisions concerning challenges to affirmative action admission programs in higher
education. 186
III.

Creating a New Compelling Governmental Interest in Order to Uphold
Race Preference Programs in Grades K-12

Race-preference programs at the K-12 level are essential to ensuring fairness and
equality in education as well as the spirit and the goals of the civil rights movements. 187
Legally, however, their constitutional durability is questionable. As a general rule, race
preference policies only survive if the defending party can show the policy is necessary to
remedy present effects of past discrimination or if it has adopted a mission statement or
other policy statement that explains that the purpose of the program is to achieve
“viewpoint diversity.” 188 Today, few school districts suffer from the effects of past
discrimination. 189 Further, many believe that the educational benefits that graduate
students derive from viewpoint diversity are not equally valuable to children in grades K12. Thus, neither of the Court’s two demonstrated compelling governmental interests in
supporting race-preference programs exist in either the Meredith or the PICS case. For
this reason, the Court must find a third compelling governmental interest that would

Id. at 1207. “The ‘academic freedom’ of a university allows it ‘to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.’” Id. (quoting
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)). High schools do not have these
freedoms. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1207. High schools are not permitted to decide who may
teach based upon racial grounds. Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)). High
schools may not decide who “may be admitted to study.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1207. When
the government provides public education in secondary schools, it “must be made available to all on equal
terms.” Id. (quoting Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)). Additionally, there are no U.S. Supreme Court
cases providing high schools with the same “academic freedoms” afforded to universities by the First
Amendment. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1207 (quoting United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717,
728-29 (1992) (observing that “a state university system is quite different in very relevant respects from primary
and secondary schools”)).
187
See infra notes ___
188
See supra notes ___
189
But see infra at note 234.
186
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survive strict scrutiny in order to ensure that the Jefferson County BOE program or
Seattle Plan remain constitutionally permissible.
While carving out a new compelling governmental interest is not out of the realm
of judicial precedent it is problematic for other reasons. 190 First, it suggests that the court
will expand its definition of permissible compelling governmental interests in the interest
of ensuring that programs created in response to a particular problem remain viable.
Second, it will send a message to the lower courts that result oriented jurisprudence is
preferable in the area of affirmative action law, thereby granting lower courts permission
to fashion their own definition of what supports a compelling governmental interest. 191
Deciding the Meredith and PICS cases comes during a highly charged period for
proponents of affirmative action. Currently, no less than four states have banned race
preference in education, including the two states with the highest profile race-preference
challenges. 192 In 1996, California adopted Proposition 209 (“Prop 209”), which banned
discrimination and preferential treatment in the State’s government and education
institutions. 193 Proponents of race-preference education programs, however, cite

190

See, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)(O’Connor, J)(writing that the context of a particular
program should dictate the definition of the strict scrutiny test.)
191
See supra note 126. “where the outcome in the Supreme Court is uncertain and past pronouncements were
made in contexts different that the context now presented, the appellate court must excercise its own
judgment.” 418 F.3d at 17 (Boudin, J. concurring)
192 In 2006 Michigan voters passed Proposition 2 banning affirmative action in higher education. California
voters passed Proposition 209 in 1996 limiting affirmative action policies in all government agencies, including
higher education. Florida also passed a law called “One Florida” limiting anti-affirmative action policies in all
state universities. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6C-6.001, .002 (2007). Washington State passed Initiative
200 banning affirmative action in 1998. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 49.60.400 (LexisNexis 2007). See
generally Stuart Silverstein, Connerly still targets racial preferences; The ex-UC regent, at USC to speak at a forum, says he
plans to put bans on affirmative action on ballots in as many as five more states next year, LA Times, Jan. 17, 2007, B2.
193 Proposition 209 (1996), CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a); see also Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson, 122
F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that proposition 209 was constitutional in that it did not violation the equal
protection clause).
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Proposition 209 as evidence of the need for race-preference programs. 194 Failure to use
race-preference admissions policies, they argue, results in reduced minority enrollment at
elite educational instructions. 195 Their opponents cite several recent studies and various
graduate school responses to anti-affirmative action, claiming that despite recent chokeholds on attempts to diversify, schools are creating new, legally sound ways to “socially
engineer racial proportionality.” 196
Regardless of which side of the race-preference debate one takes, it is clear that
whether it is Justices of the Supreme Court, 197 Presidents of elite academic
institutions, 198 or social commentators, 199 there exists a clear belief that the absence of

See Heather MacDonald, Elites to Anti-Affirmative Action Voters: Drop Dead, 17 CITY JOURNAL 15, 15-28
(Winter 2007), available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_1_prop209.html (claiming that elite California
schools are engineering ways to get around affirmative action bans).
195 See generally Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of “Systematic Analysis of
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools,” 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 1 (2005) (criticizing Sander’s
article/study as statistically narrow and offering opposing reasons for low minority success rates in law school);
Jeffery Rosen, How I Learned to Love Quotas, NY TIMES, June 1, 2003, Magazine Ed., p. 54; Marisa Schultz, Prop
2's effects; Minority admissions drop slightly at U-MOfficials: It's too early to blame ban for dip, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 17,
2007, 3A (finding that minority enrollment has dropped at U. Mich. after prop. 2 passing); Eleanor Yang Su,
UC's diversity threatened, educator says; Atkinson promotes affirmative action, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 1,
2007, B3 (former U. of Cal. President warned in a speech that if more states pass anti-affirmative action laws
minority enrollment would plument, citing effects of prop. 209 in California); but see Heather MacDonald, Elites
to Anti-Affirmative Action Voters: Drop Dead, 17 CITY JOURNAL 15, 15-28 (Winter 2007), available at
http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_1_prop209.html (claiming that elite California schools are engineering
ways to get around affirmative action bans).
196 See Richard Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STANFORD LAW
REVIEW 367 (2004) (claiming that affirmative action programs in higher education may actually harm minority
success rates, rather than help because the programs admit unqualified students); MacDonald, supra note 194, at
15; see also Shikha Dalmia, Blacks and Hispanics Don’t Need Racial Preference Laws: As California shows, minorities get
into good schools all the same, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, B2; Rich Lowry, They Want to Discriminate,
NATIONAL REV. ONLINE, Nov. 3, 2006; see generally Ellis Cose, The Color of Change; Why are we still debating whether
race should be a factor in college admissions?, NEWSWEEK November 13, 2006, p.52.
197 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No.05-915, 126 S. Ct.
2351 (June 5, 2006) (comments of Justice Ginsburg (“What’s constitutionally required one day gets
constitutionally prohibited the next day. That’s very odd.”)); id. at 12 (comments of Justice Souter (“How
could the Constitution the day that the decree is removed tell the school board it cannot make efforts any
more, it can’t do what its been doing and we’ll send the children back to their black schools and white
schools”)).
198 Responding to the Michigan vote to ban racial preference, Mary Sue Coleman, President of U. of Michigan
said, “I am standing here today to tell you that I will not allow this University to go down the Path of
Medioctiry.” MacDonald, supra note 195, at 29.
199 See, e.g., Johnson & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note __; Charles R. Calleros, Law, Policy, and Strategies for
Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 51 (2006) (providing a guide for university admissions
policy and strategy); Leslie Garfield, The Cost of Good Intentions: Why the Supreme Court’s Decision Upholding
194
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race-preference programs in academia—at any level—will result in a return to the
disproportionately white classrooms of the Fifties and Sixties. Data confirms this
concern. A recent study at the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University found that as
“desegregation plans have been dismantled across the South, the proportion of black
students in majority white schools has decreased by 13 percentage points.” 200

Several

other studies confirm an increase in residential isolation among racial groups. 201
The concerns that Justices Ginsburg and Breyer raised that abandoning the racepreference programs that the Jefferson County School Board created in response to a
court ordered desegregation plan, might result in a return to segregated schools seem a
real possibility. 202 To the extent that other Justices agree with them, 203 there is little
room under the current law to uphold the race-preference school assignment plans in the
Meredith and PICS cases. Under the current law, since the Jefferson County BOE
program has its genesis in a court ordered mandate, it can only be upheld if the court
finds that present effects of past discrimination remain in Jefferson County. 204 The

Affirmative Action Admission Programs is Detrimental to the Cause, 27 PACE L. REV. 15 (2006); Rosen, supra note 195;
For an interesting discussion on the compatibility and efficacy of the non-legal social movement and legal
movement supporting affirmative action, in the context of the Grutter case, see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites,
Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005) (reasoning that the
affirmative action movement only achieved minimal gains through legal means, as evidenced by the Grutter
decision).
200
Frankenberg, Erica, et. al., A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools Are We Losing the Dream?, Civil Rights
Project at Harvard University (January 2003); see also, Kozol, Jonathan, Still Separate, Still Unequal: America's
Educational Apartheid, 311 Harper’s Magazine 1864 (Sep. 2005).
201 See, Traub, James, Return to Segregation New York Times Magazine (Dec. 21 2001) reprinted at Race
Matters, http://www.racematters.org/returntosegregation.htm. (2000 census report confirms that Hispanics
and Asians are living in more heavily Hispanic and Asian neighborhoods than they were 10 years ago, while
whites and blacks are only slightly more exposed to one another than they were in 1990); Separate but Unequal: A
New Study Documents a Return to Segregation, 118 Amer. School Bd. J. 10 (2001)
202 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 12, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No.05-915, 126 S. Ct.
2351 (June 5, 2006); see also supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing comments at oral argument).
203 To be fair, at least three justices (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) on the court have voted against affirmative
action policies, finding no compelling governmental interest in “viewpoint diversity.” See Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 346 (2003) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
204 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools, 426 F.3d 1162, 1197 (Bea, J., dissenting) (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467 (1992)).
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recent testimony makes clear that such is not the case. 205 Alternatively, given the Court’s
contextual approach to race-preference programs, the Court could clearly find that the
interest in “viewpoint diversity” supports a compelling governmental interest in the
Jefferson County BOE program or in the Seattle Plan, however, there are compelling
arguments against merging race-preference policies at the K-12 level with those created
for graduate school admissions. 206
To be sure, the Court has various options and legal theories at its disposal for
reaching conclusions it finds socially correct. Where a program violates an individual’s
rights as guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause, the Court may always find a socially
correct interest that overrides the Equal Protection violation. 207 The Court, therefore,
has the power to identify new evidence which, if presented, would justify a permissible
infringement. 208 Ideally, however, creating a new compelling governmental interest
would be a last resort and the Court should first consider whether it could uphold a
challenged race-preference plan under existing identified compelling governmental
interests.
A. Evaluating Race-Preference Student Assignment Plans in the context of
the Court’s Already Defined Compelling Governmental Interests.
Where the party defending a race-preference plan, created in response to a court
ordered desegregation program, can no longer produce evidence of present effects of past

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No.05-915, 126 S. Ct.
2351 (June 5, 2006) (comments of Mr. Mellen (“We do not contend . . . that the purpose of the plan is to
remediate past discrimination against black students.”)).
206 See infra at notes 227-232.
207
See supra at notes 44-95.
208
The Court has significant precedent behind it to support any legal reasoning based on shifting societal
views. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding Texas anti-abortion laws unconstitutional); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) on segregation); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick)
205
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discrimination, the Court must strike the plan down. 209 Present effects of past
discrimination, sufficient to support a compelling governmental interest, have been
established by judicial findings, as evidenced by court ordered consent decrees,210
Congressional, State or city council findings 211 or any other substantiated statistics or
other evidentiary indicia.212 The proof, however, must be specific and narrowly tailored
to the remedial program it seeks to remedy. 213 Thus, when the City of Richmond
provided only a generalized assertion that there had been past discrimination in the entire
construction industry, the court found it was to broad to support a compelling
governmental interest in requiring prime contractors awarded city construction contracts
to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract to one or more
“Minority Business Enterprises.” 214 In Paradise, the Court held that a court order was
justified by a finding of a compelling governmental interest in a race-preference
promotion plan. 215

See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools, 426 F.3d at 1197 (Bea, J., dissenting) (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467
(1992)).
210 See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 164 (1987) (consent decrees).
211 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 484 (1989) (the majority at the Circuit Court
level “found that national findings of discrimination in the construction industry, when considered in
conjunction with the statistical study concerning the awarding of prime contracts in Richmond, rendered the
city council’s conclusion that low minority participation in city contracts was due to past discrimination
‘reasonable.’”). But see id. at 504 (“While the States and their subdivisions may take remedial action when they
possess evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination, they must
identify that discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they may use race conscious relief.
Congress has made national findings that there has been societal discrimination in a host of fields. If all a state
or local government need do is find a congressional report on the subject to enact a set-aside program, the
constraints of the Equal Protection Clause will, in effect, have been rendered a nullity.”).
212 See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 501; Paradise, 480 U.S. at 172-74.
213 See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493 (“The test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal
so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype.”); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183-84.
214 J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 510-11.
215 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 185-86. The Supreme Court, Justice Brennan, held that the 50 percent promotion
requirement was permissible under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it was
justified by compelling governmental interest in eradicating discriminatory exclusion of blacks from positions
and was narrowly tailored to serve its purposes. Id.
209
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Jefferson County originally adopted its court ordered desegregation plan in
response to a Sixth Circuit directive, called the Haycraft desegregation decree. 216 In June
1999, the same court found that the Haycraft plan was still legally in effect. 217 The
following year, however, the court dissolved the desegregation decree and ordered JCPS
to “cease using racial quotas” 218 and to redesign and reevaluate admissions procedures at
the grammar schools. 219 The current plan, which is under Court review, is a voluntary
extension of the court’s desegregation plan. 220 The Seattle plan, which is the subject of
the PICS challenge, was adopted in response to an identified imbalance in school
registration and the racial tension that resulted there from. 221 In fact, the Seattle Plan,
was the first comprehensive desegregation plan adopted voluntarily and without a court
order. 222
In both the Meredith and the PICS cases, the proponent of the race preference
program could not present evidence of present effects of past discrimination. Indeed, the
Sixth Circuit has already concluded that there is no longer a need to legally mandate
desegregation, or any program that would promote integration in public schools. 223 And
despite Seattle’s long running voluntary desegregation program, the City never has, nor
would it be likely to provide credible evidence of present effects of past

Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County, 489 F.2d 925, 932 (6th Cir. 1973)
(Gordon, J.).
217 Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 774 (W.D. Ky. 1999) [hereinafter Hampton
I].
218 Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 377-81 (W.D. Ky. 2000) [hereinafter
Hampton II].
219 Id.
220 McFarland v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
221 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1167-1169 (9th Cir. 2005).
222 Id. at 1168
223 See McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 851-52 (quoting Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 61 (6th Cir.
1966) (discussing the active role of democratically elected school boards in promoting diversity and the court’s
deference toward their decisions)
216
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discrimination. 224 Consequently, a reviewing Court would not be able to find a
compelling governmental interest based on an historic need to right past vestiges of
segregation. 225 However, as Judge Heyburn recognized in Meredith, as many school
systems escape the mandate of desegregation decrees, they face a choice of direction. 226
As an analysis of Meredith and PICS illustrate the constraint of the Equal Protection
Laws seem to confine such a direction in light of its treatment of race-preference policies
adopted in response to desegregation decrees. The Court’s application of the compelling
governmental interest prong as it relates to education based race-preference policies,
however, seems to offer another means by which programs with their roots in
desegregation plans can be upheld.
Even if the Court cannot find present effects of past discrimination, it can find a
compelling governmental interest on another identifiable ground. The Court has held that
there is a compelling governmental interest in attaining “viewpoint diversity.” 227 Justice
Powell, writing for a fractionalized majority in Bakke, was the first to recognize that there
was a compelling governmental interest in hearing different voices in the classroom. 228
In both Grutter and Gratz, the Court echoed Justice Powell’s conclusion. 229 In Grutter,
The dissent pointed out that both parties concede that the plan does not attempt to remedy past effects
discrimination in the school district or community. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools, 426 F.3d at 1197. At the
District Court level, it was established that the Seattle Choice Plan was created for the sole purpose of
“mitigate[ing] the historical effects on its high schools of the residential segregation of Seattle's neighborhoods,
and to allow all students the opportunity to benefit from the pedagogical and socio-cultural values a racially
diverse school offers.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2001). The
District Court concluded that convincing evidence was presented that segregated housing patterns existed in
the Seattle School District which caused the school systems to be racially concentrated. Id. at 1235.
225 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-06. The Supreme Court subsequently has agreed with that position. See Wygant, 476
U.S. at 274-76 (plurality opinion).
226 See McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 850-51. “It would seem rather odd that the concepts of equal protection,
local control and limited deference are now only one-way streets to a particular educational policy, virtually
prohibiting the voluntary continuation of policies once required by law.” Id. at 851.
227 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Ca. at Davis v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 311-12 (1978).
228 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
229 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 (2003).
224
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Justice O’Connor wrote, “today we endorse Justice Powell's view that student body
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify using race in university
admissions.” 230 For this reason, the Court in Grutter, found that the Law School’s
mission statement, which stated that admitting a “critical mass” of underrepresented
minority students was essential to its educational mission. 231 Evidence of a mission
statement that highlights a program’s goal of attaining diversity for its educational
benefits is sufficient to support a compelling governmental interest. 232
The value of “viewpoint diversity” at the college and post-graduate level is two
fold. First, the Court has held that to the extent that undergraduate and graduate schools
are engaged in training future leaders, there is a significant value in those leaders
understanding contrary viewpoints. 233 These viewpoints may bring “outlooks and ideas
that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with
understanding their vital service to humanity.” 234 Creating diversity in the classroom is
equally important to civil tolerance. 235 Second, the Court stated that “diversity promotes
learning outcomes and better prepares students for an increasingly diverse work force, for
society, and for the legal profession.” 236 Ultimately, however, the Court held that the
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
Id. at 340.
232 Id.; see also Leslie Garfield, The Cost of Good Intentions: Why the Supreme Court’s Decision Upholding Affirmative
Action Admission Programs is Detrimental to the Cause, 27 PACE L. REV. 15 (2006);
233 See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950). In Sweatt, the Court made a similar point with specific
reference to legal education:
230
231

The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in
isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and
no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from
the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.
Id. at 634.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
235 Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
236 Id. at 330-32. Note also that the court relied heavily on the Amicus Brief of the Army. Id. at 330. Highranking retired officers and civilian military leaders assert that a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps is
234
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stated mission of the law school to admit a “critical mass” of diverse voices in the
classroom so that various points of view could be heard and understood, was sufficient to
support its finding that achieving student diversity in the context of public higher
education is a compelling governmental interest. 237
The Grutter Court placed significant emphasis on the law school’s stated mission.
Indeed, the Court held that the Law School could only achieve its mission by admitting a
critical mass of diverse students. 238 Under this analysis, if the Meredith or PICS
defendants are able to show that their mission in adopting the voluntary race-preference
plans is to create a diverse student body so that students can benefit from various voices,
the Court might find that student body diversity is a compelling governmental interest in
the context of education at the K-12 level. However, neither the JCPS nor the City of
Seattle are likely to be able to provide such evidence.239 Each program was created to
erase segregation from their school districts. 240 The Supreme Court’s edict in Brown v.

essential to national security. Id. at 331. American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures,
ideas, and viewpoints. Id. at 330. “Moreover, because universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the
training ground for a large number of the Nation's leaders . . . . the path to leadership must be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.” Id. at 331 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,
634 (1950)). Thus, the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.
237 Id. at 330-31. The court also noted that:
the Law School's admissions policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to break
down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons of different
races.’ These benefits are ‘important and laudable,’ because ‘classroom discussion is livelier,
more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting’ when the students have ‘the
greatest possible variety of backgrounds.’
Id. at 330 (citations omitted).
238
Id. at 333. diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and
one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students. The Court also considered the
U.S. military’s mission of meeting the needs of national security as support for finding a compelling
governenmental interest in the context of higher education. "[B]ased on [their] decades of experience," a
"highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission
to provide national security." Id. (citing, Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae 5.)
239 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005);
McFarland v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 851-51 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
240 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools, 426 F.3d at 1167-1169; McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
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Board of Education that racial discrimination in education is wrong, 241 was likely the
more sufficient reason to compel the voluntary integration plans that produced diversity
in the classroom.
Thus, unlike the Law School’s mission of creating a diverse student body so that
future lawyers can appreciate various viewpoints, the Seattle Plan and the Jefferson
County BOE plan are designed to provide learning opportunities at the “best schools in
the district” for students who might otherwise have the opportunity to attend such schools
if the school districts were drawn along neighborhood lines. 242 Therefore, because the
missions of the Jefferson County BOE and Seattle Plan do not state a goal of enhancing
the learning experience of all in the classroom, the notion of “viewpoint diversity” is
likely not to support a compelling governmental interest. In fact “the educational benefits
[do not] remain the same” 243
The majority opinions in both McFarland 244 and PICS wrestled with the notion of
relying on the findings of Grutter that the educational benefit of diversity in higher
education extends to students in grades K-12 but ultimately came out in favor of finding
viewpoint diversity was a sufficient compelling governmental interest in the context of
grade K-12 education, thereby extending Justice Powell’s definition beyond the limits of
public higher education. 245 Judge Fisher in PICS was comfortable finding that “the
affirmative educational benefits that flow from racial diversity” 246 sufficiently exist in
grade school, and thus the court was comfortable in finding a compelling governmental
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Parents Involved in Cmty Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 423 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005);
McFarland v. Jefferson County Bd. Of Educ. 330 F.Supp 2d 834,851 (W.D. Ky. 2004)
243 McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 841.
244
See supra note __
245 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools, 426 F.3d at 1175; McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 852, 856.
246 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools, 426 F.3d at 1175.
241

242
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interest. The McFarland court similarly found that the educational benefits identified in
Grutter were sufficiently present to support a compelling governmental interest in the
instance case. 247 But the court decisions seem to gloss over the seemingly important
differences between educational benefits at primary and secondary school level and the
benefits in post-secondary schools.
Several appellate court judges disagreed with the appropriate application of
Justice Powell’s findings in Bakke to K-12 program. In concurring and dissenting
opinions respectively, Judges Boudin, Kozinski and Bea suggested that while viewpoint
diversity was a sufficient compelling governmental interest, there was no demonstrable
evidence of the need for viewpoint diversity in the cases before them. 248 Judge Boudin
wrote that the context of a plan adopted to promote safety and student attendance was so
distinct from anything the Court had previously considered, that it was wrong of the
Comfort majority to apply the Court’s previously stated compelling governmental
interests in the case before him. 249 In his PICS concurrence, Judge Kozinski was critical
of the majority for failing to recognize the differing contexts of education in a child’s
formative years as opposed to the graduate school level. To Judge Kozinski, applying
Grutter to the case before him was tantamount to “pounding square pegs into a round
hole.” 250 Judge Bea, joined by three other judges, wrote that it was wholly inappropriate
to consider the Seattle Plan in the same context as public higher education programs. 251
Indeed, Justice Boudin correctly points out that to date, the Court has only stated
that there is a compelling governmental interest in viewpoint diversity in the context of
McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 856.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools, 426 F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring); id. at 1203-04 (Bea, J., dissenting).
249
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250
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251
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public higher education. 252

Should the Supreme Court following the reasoning of the

appellate court judges who reject the application of viewpoint diversity to grades K-12, it
must find a different constitutionally acceptable compelling governmental interest in the
use of race-preference student assignment plans or it must abolish the program. 253
B. Constructing a New Compelling Governmental Interest
Some members of the Supreme Court are clearly concerned with abolishing
programs that have attained their goals. 254 As Justice Beyer said in the Meredith case
oral arguments, it would be difficult to tell a school district “it cannot make efforts any
more, it can’t do what its been doing and we’ll send the children back to their black
schools and white schools?” 255 For this reason the Court could define a third compelling
governmental interest which would be the need to preserve programs whose abolishment
threatens a return to the de facto segregation the program originally sought to cure.
The Court, however, has never stated a compelling governmental interest in
assuring that programs created in response to de facto segregation remain constitutional
once they attain their goal of integration. 256 The Court has, however, appeared to reach a
conclusion to assure that the societal goals of abolishing racism or discrimination were
met. In Katzenbach v. McClung, 257 the Court found that a local, family-owned barbeque
restaurant that refused to serve Black patrons was in violation of the 1964 Civil Right
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Act. 258 The Court considered the Constitutionality of Title II of the Act, which Congress
enacted through its powers under the Commerce Clause, and “which requires hotels and
motels to serve transients without regard to their race or color.” 259 Ollie’s Barbeque,
which did not generally serve out of state patrons, purchased 46% of its meat from a local
supplier who procured the meat from outside the State. The Court found the Act was
constitutional as applied to anyone who served food or used merchandise that traveled
through interestate commerce. 260 Based on this reasoning, the Court found that despite
the failure of the government to show evidence of a direct impact on interstate commerce,
the owners of Ollie’s Barbeque violated the Act. 261 In McClung, the Court displayed its
willingness to hold one small restaurant, which was “trivial by itself” accountable for the
greater good of ensuring the abolishment of segregated establishments. 262 The McClung
ruling illustrates Court’s paramount interest in attaining the societal goals of reversing
discrimination. 263
Where race-preference student assignment plans are concerned, the Court is faced
with a similar challenge of constructing a means to uphold these programs, in light of the
fact that they are not supported by previously identified compelling governmental
interests. The most recent race-preference cases, Johnson, Grutter and Gratz, and the
Court’s history or responding to societal needs, support the idea that the Court may
stretch its Constitutional boundaries to define a new compelling governmental interest

Id.; See, 42 U.S.C. ss 2000a to 2000a-2 (1964 ed.).
379. U.S. at 298.
260 Id. at 305.
261 Id.
262 McLung, 379 U.S. at 301 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-1-28 (1942). See, Jim Chen,
Filburn’s Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719 (2003).
263 Id. See also, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the constitutional validity
of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against an attack no hotels, motels, and like establishments.)
258
259

48

when the context of a particular program is distinguishable from those the Court has
previously considered. 264
The Seattle School Board adopted the Seattle Plan because assigning students to
schools based on neighborhoods resulted in de facto segregation. The same was true of
the Lynn School Board which was challenged in the Comfort decision and with the
Jefferson County Board of Education. 265

In each instance, the School Board was driven

by the need to achieve the constitutional guarantees of Brown v. Board of Education, 266
which held that schools that learning in a segregated school environmental is “inherently
unequal.” 267 Abolishment of these programs would, arguably, result in a return to
neighborhood assignment plans, which would, in turn, yield in de facto segregation
again. 268 Given these circumstances, the Court would best serve the needs of school
districts to retain hard-earned gains of equal education at the K-12 level by finding a
compelling governmental interest in assuring that programs created in response to de
facto segregation remain constitutional once they attain their goal of integration. 269 A
party defending a race-preference student assignment plan could support this compelling
governmental interest by presenting evidence that abolishment of the program would
result in a return to unequal school for different racial groups.
There is ample evidence available to support the assertion that abolishment of
race-preference student assignment plans could result in a return to de fact segregation.
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Neighborhood school assignment plans remain the most race-neutral means of assigning
students to particular schools at the K-12 level. 270 It is also the means by which most
schools assign students. The flaw in neighborhood assignment plans, however, is that to
date, many neighborhoods remain racially segregated. 271 Thus assignment by
neighborhood would result in segregated schooling.
The Court has long recognized that American’s live in segregated areas and that
housing patterns require congressional and judicial intervention in order to assure racial
equity. Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act to “prevent discrimination in the
exercise of the electoral franchise and to foster our transformation to a society that is no
longer fixated on race.” 272 One purpose of the act was to “adopt devices that [States] used
to thwart the will of congress to secure franchise for blacks” 273 such as racial
“gerrymandering,” which is "[t]he practice of dividing a geographic area into electoral
districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by
diluting the opposition's voting strength." 274 State legislatures would draw boundaries by
neighborhood, extending lines so that particular groups would be included together.
Implicit in this guard against racial gerrymandering is that racial groups tend to live in
neighborhoods that are segregated from other racial groups. Since evidence supports that

270

Ryan, James and Heise, Michael, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 Yale L.J. 2043, 2050 (June
2002)(recognizing that physical boundaries yielded segregated schooling); see also, Huffman, Kevin, Charter
Schools, Equal Protection Litigation and the New School Reform Movement, 73 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1290 (October
1998)(noting that neighborhood school assignments were most common to public schools).
271 Downey, K, Segregation Persists in Housing, Study Says, The Washington Post, April 6, 2005 p. EO2;
Keen, C. Housing Segregation Persists in Many Parts of the Nation, Sutdy Shows,
www.law.fsu.edu/Journals/landuse/Vol141/seit.htm (May 2004)
272Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 490 (2003); cf. post, at 2662 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.).
273 S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1982) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982 p. 177 (hereinafter
S.Rep. No. 97-417).
274Black's Law Dictionary 708 (8th ed. 2004).

50

current segregated housing patterns remain the norm, school assignment plans based on
living patterns could yield de facto segregation.
The School Boards in the Meredith and PICS cases could most likely meet this
burden of showing that their race-preference student assignment plans were adopted in
response to concerns of potential de facto segregation and that abolishment of their
programs could result in a return to the very evil the plans sought to cure. In Meredith,
JCPS put forth evidence that the Jefferson County BOE plan was developed as a means
to retain the gains JCPS made through its court ordered desegregation plan. After the
district court ruled that racial quotas were no longer necessary to achieve equal education,
JCPS held public hearings and devised a means to ensure its desegregation efforts would
not be thwarted. 275 Defendant’s in the PICS case presented evidence that the Seattle Plan
was created because high school assignment based soles on a student’s residential
neighborhood resulted in de facto segregation. 276
A third compelling governmental interest in ensuring that gains made from a racepreference plan will not be undone is appropriate in light of the need to maintain the
equality strides made over the past four decades. This interest is better suited for
consideration of student assignment plans at the K-12 level than is the applicability of
“viewpoint diversity.” At the outset, the race-preference student assignment plans were
not created to ensure students hear from different voices in the classroom. They were
created to guarantee that all students receive the same quality education. 277 The need for
diversity in the elementary classroom is mandated by the understanding that there is a
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link between segregated schools and academic achievement. 278 The driving notion of
access to equal education is wholly different from hearing diverse viewpoints. For this
reason, it is appropriate to consider the compelling governmental interest in programs
aimed at grades K-12 in a different context from programs for institutes of higher
learning.
Opponents may argue that there is no reason to create a contextual divide between
race-preference policies in graduate schools and those in K-12 programs. The Court
could find that viewpoint diversity is helpful to students in public area grammar and high
schools. In Grutter, the Court found that “the educational benefits that diversity was
designed to produce were substantial, including to promote cross-racial understanding, to
help break down racial stereotypes and to enable students to better understand persons of
different races, to promote learning outcomes, to better prepare students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society and to better prepare students as
professionals.” 279 Clearly it is never too early to learn those lessons. Alternatively, the
Court could choose to find that the since there is no compelling interesting attaining
viewpoint diversity in grades K-12 the programs do not pass constitutional muster.
As recently as 2005, however, in the Johnson case, the Court reaffirmed its
commitment to letting the context of a particular program drive a court’s evaluation. The
arguments in favor of distinguishing the context of diversity in grade schools – that they
are designed to accomplish different programmatic goals, for one – seem most
compelling and therefore necessitate that the Court consider plans that admit students to
278 See Orfield, Gary, Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Desegregation, The Harvard Civil
Rights Project (July 2002) reprinted at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/separate_schools01.php; See also, Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
279 Grutter, 539 U.S. 308.
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various elementary and secondary schools in a context distinct from plans that admit
students to institutes of higher education.
Conclusion:
The Court’s contextual approach to evaluating the constitutionality of racepreference programs allows courts to tailor their decision making process to ensure that
the societal goals of remaining a racially diverse society are fully achieved. Arguably,
the Court has already defined the compelling governmental interest test for challenged
educational programs. According to the Court, there is educational value in achieving
viewpoint diversity in the classroom. Challenged race-preference student assignment
plans do no necessarily survive the compelling governmental interest prong of the strict
scrutiny test, when it is considered against the context of past Court decisions, which are
limited to considering race-preference programs at the graduate level. For this reason,
the Court might have to strike down race-preference student assignment plans for school
at theK-12 level.
Striking down race-preference student assignment plans, however, will yield an
undesirable result. It will extinguish programs that secure educational equality to
students in a particular district and threaten a return to de facto segregation. For this
reason, the Court should recognize educational programs at the elementary and secondary
school level should be considered in a different context than programs at institutes of
higher learning.
It is perfectly appropriate and indeed justifiable for the Court to find a compelling
governmental interest in preserving programs whose abolishment threatens a return to the
de facto segregation the programs originally sought to cure. Under this test, a court can
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uphold a race-preference plan if the defending party can show that invalidating the plan
would result in a return to the segregation or racial discrimination that existed before the
government put the program in place.
“Interpretation is a chameleon that takes its color from its context.” 280 Where
race-preference plans or programs are concerned, the Court has recognized that the
context of a program can drive the result. In this instance, the Court would be well
advised to interpret the context of race-preference programs for grades K-12 as
something wholly separate from that at the graduate level. Doing so would result in a
continuation of the strides toward a color-blind society that school districts across the
Country have fought so hard to achieve.
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